Mbaye Lo
Cleveland State University
Kent State University
Abstract
This article analyzes the associational relationship between Islam
and terrorism as embedded in the current popular culture. Two questions
are examined: (a) whether from a historical and political perspective
current organizations that are terror threats and Bin Laden are natural
outgrowths of the Islamic tradition; (b) whether the Muslim popular
tradition has historically interpreted some Qur'anic terms such as Jihad and Kuffar "allegedly
infidels" to promote hate and violence against non-Muslims.
In view of this discussion, the article suggests that the current
terror treats is due to the politicization of the Muslim faith, rather
than rooted in Islamic teachings.
Introduction:
Scope and Thesis
[1] The aim of this article is twofold. First, to address whether
from a historical and political perspective, current organizations
that are terror threats and Osama Bin Laden, the founder and spiritual
leader of al-Qaeda, are natural outgrowths of Islamic tradition.
Second, to survey the understanding of the terms Kuffar, Jihad and
the concept of non-Muslims in the Muslim popular tradition. Finally,
the article illustrates that the roots of terrorism is in the misinterpretation
and politicization of Islam.
[2] In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attack on the
World Trade Center, a popular trend of thought quickly emerged that
Islam is the root of terrorism. A range of religious leaders, academicians
and public intellectuals subscribe to this theory. For example, Franklin
Graham, a popular evangelical leader, told NBC News that Islam is
a "very evil and wicked religion. When you read the Qur'an and
you read the verses from the Qur'an, it instructs the killing of
the infidel, or those that are non-Muslim.''1 Another
religious leader and broadcaster, Pat Robertson, is the founder and
chairman of the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), asserted that
upon reading the Qur'an, he found Islam "not a peaceful religion
that wants to co-exist."2 Bernard
Lewis, professor of history at Princeton University seized the opportunity
to use the event of September 11 as proof of his long held-theory
that there is a "clash of civilization" between Islam
and the West.3 Daniel Pipes,
a columnist for the New York Post and Jerusalem Post,
equated converts to Islam with converts to violence.4 He
considers collective Islamic organizations the same as terrorist
groups who have been promoting "violence against the U.S. for
more than two decades." Another writer, Jonah Goldberg of the
New Republic, describes Islam as "alien, sometimes medieval,
and often corrupt, theoretical fascism."5
[3] With such strong beliefs that Islam is the source of terrorism,
one might ask what evidence associates Islam with terrorism? The
relevant literature centres on two types of evidence: empirical and
relational. First, more than two-thirds of the terrorist organizations
on the U.S. State Department's terrorist list are linked with Islam.
These organizations, under the pretext that Qur'anic teachings encourage Jihad and
call non-Muslims Kuffar (infidels), use Islam as a rallying
point to perpetuate violence against the U.S. and U.S. nationals.
Second, Osama Bin Laden, a follower of Islam, and al-Qaeda, a purported
Islamic organization, was behind the heinous act of September 11.
The Origin of Modern Islamic Organizations
[4] As to the first kind of evidence, a historical look at the true
origin of modern Islamic organizations offers no proof that they
promoted hate or violence. Actually, Islamic organizations emerged
in the late nineteen and early twentieth century to reconcile Islamic
intellectualism with European modernity. The history of modern Muslim
groups, reformists and Islamists alike, goes back to five towering
figures who laid the intellectual foundation for collective activism
in modern Muslim society.
[5] The Salafi movement was started in the turn of the nineteenth
century by Muhammed Abduh (1844-1905), an Egyptian intellectual reformer,
and Seyyed Jamaluddin Afghani (1838-1897), whose last name "Afghani" refers
to his Afghan-Persian heritage. These two met while in exile in Paris,
where they established a religious society called the Salafi movement
that sought to remedy Islamic schism by attempting to rationalize
the laws of the Qur'an with what they called the Nahdah movement
(renaissance). While Abduh focused on Egypt and rest of the
Arab world, Afghani traveled across India, Persia, Afghanistan, Egypt
and the Ottoman Empire. Abduh's conciliatory views between Islam
and the West are evident in his perspective on reform. He returned
to Egypt in 1889 to become the Grand Mufti of Egypt and a close friend
to Lord Cromer, the British consul general. From this powerful position
of controlling all religious establishments, he took on the task
of transforming the educational systems from the shackles of religious
tradition.6 He criticized both
radical as well as progressive interpretations of Islam; called for
de-politicizing the educational system, and advocated good relationships
with Western countries. He once explained to a group of journalists
who confronted him on his return from Europe, "I found Islam
[in the West], but not Muslims, and in the Muslim World I found Muslims,
but not Islam." His statement views Islam as tantamount to freedom,
transparency and rule of law, which he admires in the West.7 The
impact of these two figures on Arab and Muslim intellectual circles
around the turn of the twentieth century was similar to the impact
of the European renaissance in the sixteenth century.
[5] The third illustrious figure was Hasan Al-Banna (1906-1949),
an Egyptian ideologue and founder of Ikhwanul-Muslimeen (The
Muslim Brotherhood) in 1928. Al-Banna followed the lead of the Salafi movement,
but capitalized on spiritual reformation as going hand in hand with
socio-political reform in the Muslim world. Al-Banna had the most
profound influence on modern Islamic organizations. His movement,
the Muslim Brotherhood, used the symbol of Jihad in unifying Muslim
nations, fighting illiteracy and poverty. By 1948, the Muslim Brotherhood
had branches that included hundred of thousands in Syria, Iraq, Palestine,
and Sudan. The movement built schools, created clinics, and disseminated
the idea of civic activism to the masses. Although Al-Banna has repeatedly
explained the centrality of spiritual struggle and self-purification
in his definition of Jihad, he has been widely and incorrectly portrayed
as a man of violence. He was assassinated by the Egyptian secret
police in 1949, because he was perceived as a threat to the Egyptian
government.
[6] Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), An Egyptian teacher and a social critic
who joined the Muslim Brotherhood movement after his return from
a two-year study in the United States in 1950, brought the intellectual
aspects of Islam to the Brotherhood. His two books: Social
Justice in Islam and Inthe Shade of the Qur'an mirror
his wish for a just political system that reconciles Western modernity
and Islamic values. Looking beyond Qutb's sharp criticism of democracy,
which he considers bankrupted in the West, one will not find any
contradiction between Qutb's focus on the Islamic concept of Shura,
which he considers the principle of Muslim politics, and the concept
of democracy as it is practiced in the West.8 Shura,
the Arabic word for consultation, refers to the process of mutual
consultation in Islamic law, in which the ruler must consult his
followers in making decisions. Qutb was detained in concentration
camps by President Jamal Abudu Nasser of Egypt and eventually executed
in 1966.
[7] Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979) established the Jama'at
al-Islami Party in Lahore, Pakistan. He assimilated Western
ideas of activism and oppositionalism to postulate a mechanism
of power transfer in an Islamic state. Mawdudi, one of the
most important Islamic revivalists, rejected the case of Jihad
in Kashmir and underwent imprisonment in Pakistan as a result.
[8] For each of these figures, the term Jihad was mostly seen
in its spiritual meaning, as a struggle for self-purification, and
physical Jihad is interpreted as non-existent except in the case
of protecting oneself and preserving ones property or religion. Although
Western scholars have widely portrayed Qutb as the spiritual father
of current radical Muslim groups, 9 and
the "Islamic world's answer to Solzhenitsyn, Sartre, and Havel" who "easily
ranks with all of them in influence," to quote Daniel Benjamin
and Steven Simon,10 scholars
throughout the Muslim world consider Qutb an intellectual, a person
of letters and not a source of religious knowledge.11 His
literary style is used in language and literature courses to demonstrate
the discursive potency of the Qur'an and never to draw religious
edicts.
The
Ideological Foundation of al-Qaeda
[9] As to the second kind of evidence, related to Bin Laden, an analytical
study of the ideological foundation of the organization and Bin Laden's
narrative discourse gives a clear view that this man and his organization
are products of what the Egyptian press calls Petrodollar ideology
and fanaticism. The term Petrodollar was coined by the Egyptian press
in the late 1980s to attack the Wahhabi ideology that was
spreading throughout the Muslim world. "Petro" denotes
the oil wealth of the Arabian Peninsula that supports this ideology,
while "dollar" denotes the Western backing of this radical
interpretation of Islam. Wahhabi ideology became the surrogate
army in fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. In Charlie Wilson's
War, George Crile explained how the U.S. government sponsored
the biggest Jihad of the twentieth century through this ideology.12
[10] The leading terrorist groups on the U.S. State Department's
terrorist list are militant Kashmiri groups, the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan, the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, Armed Islamic
Group in Algeria and its radical offshoots known as the Salafi groups.
What these groups have in common is that their core leadership is
exclusively battle-hardened and highly motivated Afghan fighters¾former Mujahideen or
Arab Afghans.
[11] Wahhabism, which is the ideological underpinning of Bin
Laden, is monolithic in its origin and conservative in its interpretation
of Islam; it has long been rejected by the overwhelming majority
of the Muslims. Both the theology and the political apparatus of Wahhabism came
from Hijaz (modern day Saudi Arabia) to remedy what was perceived
as a deviation by the Muslims of Arabia from the true Islamic faith.
In 1744, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, a religious leader, agreed with
Muhammad bin Saud, the founding father of the Saudi Royal family,
to take an oath that they would work together to bring the Arabs
of the Peninsula back to the simplest and purest form of Islam. This
marriage of interest between the Wahhabi interpretation of
Islam and the Saud dynasty was revived in the rebirth of Modern Saudi
Arabia in 1932.
[12] Following the large oil revenues of the 1970s and early 1980s,
the Wahhabi stream became the driving force throughout the
Muslim World. On the one hand, it used the wealth of the Arabia to
pay royalties to its citizens, the Arab world, and promote its vision
of Islam to other Muslim countries. It also carefully placed its
graduates in religious schools, called Madarasa in Southeast
Asia, Khalwa in North Africa and Dara in West Africa.
On the other hand, Western powers used the Wahhabi movement
as the vanguard for resisting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Bin Laden's early messages as a fund-raiser for the Afghan Mujahideen were
directed to the Arabian royal families. He reminded them that the
fight against the Soviets was not only to protect Afghanistan, but
also to defend them from the creeping communism. Bin Laden's early
messages were printed in leading Arabic journals of the Gulf such
as Majallatul Al-Faisal, Majalatul Al-alam, etc.
[13] Wahhabism is radical in its interpretation of the formal
moralityof Islam, and naïve in its interpretation of
the ritual practices of Islam. Although it is a Sunni subgroup, it
repudiates other Muslim sects¾Shiites and Sufi as well as
other Sunni reformists such as Muhammad Abduh, Jamaluddin Afgani,
Hasan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Sayyid Mawdudi.
Bin Laden's Narrative Discourse
[14] A linguistic analysis of Bin Laden's speeches in his current
rhetorical manipulation through Al-Jazirah and Arabic newspapers,
uncovers that Bin Laden crafts a selective and biased, i.e., distorted
interpretation of Islam, while ignoring the moderate interpretation
that is more popular and widely adopted in the Muslim world. There
are two aspects to Bin Laden's rhetorical strategy. First,
there is a common denominator between his vocabulary and that found
in Wahhabi literature. The only difference is that Bin Laden
shifted this rhetoric from condemning Muslim opponents of the Wahhabi
ideology as it was used before, to addressing Westerners in general
and American and Israelis in particular. Second, recognizing his
flimsy religious base, Bin Laden uses two sets of vocabulary in his
speeches. In some instances, he uses religiously oriented language
such as Kuffr (infidel), Mushrik (polytheist), Mufsid
fil- Ard (oppressor), Mutajabbir (arrogant) and Hubal (of
the age). In others, Bin Laden uses politically oriented vocabulary
such as language regarding police state, rights of the people, Muslim
issues in alQuds and Palestine, and deaths of Iraqi
children, in order to denounce Arab regimes' alliances with the U.S.
[15] On the first level, Bin Laden's target audience is his core
adherents¾those who fought with him in the Afghan war. They
are known across the Arab world as the "Arab Afghans," but
Bin Laden has constantly addressed them as the true Mujahideen,
thus breaking rank with the mainstream Arabs and Muslims who do not
keep the Mujahideen label for these former fighters. In a
linguistic sense, the term Mujahideen is from the root word Jahada from
which the term Jihad is formed. Jihad means "to
strive in the cause of Allah," therefore, Mujahideen literary
means "strugglers in the cause of Allah." In popular Islamic Fiqh (jurisprudence), Jihad is
applied widely to many forms of peaceful striving such as providing
for one's family, seeking knowledge, resisting one's desire, etc.13 The
term also has developed some special meanings over time to center
on two concepts: the first concept is Jihad ul-akbar [the
highest form of Jihad], which is spiritual Jihad or self-purification,
and the second concept is Jihad ath-thukhra [the loWest level
of Jihad] that may involve physical struggle.14 Among
Muslim social scientists, the physical struggle, including war, is
only justified if it is to protect oneself, preserve one's property
or to stop oppression.15 As
such, keeping the status of Mujahideen for these former fighters,
as Bin Laden does, is a selective and deliberated misuse of Jihad outside
its traditional context. Ironically, Bin Laden may not be alone in
this self-serving usage of the term. Western popular actions films
such as The Living Daylights (1987) and RamboIII (1988)
have portrayed the Mujahideen flatteringly. They have depicted
Afghan fighters as Mujahideen, heroes and freedom fighters
defending their country and the rest of the "free world."
[16] On the second level, Bin Laden's target audience is mainstream
Arab society, which is only unified with respect to the Palestinian
issue and linguistic heritage. In the absence of any political opposition
to the widespread despotic and totalitarian regimes in the Arab world,
Bin Laden appears as the only true and independent political alternative.
As Shafeeq Ghabra, a popular Kuwaiti intellectual, noted: "if
an election were held in Saudi Arabia today, Bin Laden would win
it."16 Obviously, such
a victory would have a political base, not a religious one.
[17] What Bin Laden did was shift Wahhabi ideology from its
traditional Muslim-bashing base to serve his own political convictions,
including violence. As Said Aburish wrote in A Brutal Friendship:
The West and the Arab Elite, "The Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia
are a mere 20 percent of the population of the country and are favored
in a way that allows them to control all aspects of public and private
life in the Kingdom."17
Muslim Popular Tradition and the Interpretation
of the Qur'an
[18] A closer look at Muslim popular tradition shows clearly that
it contradicts current Western popular interpretations of the Qur'an
from two perspectives. First, in the West, popular and even intellectual
interpretations of the Qur'an, as witnessed in the post 9/11 era,
clearly depart from Islamic tradition. While this new interpretation
emphasizes the semantic meanings of the sacred texts, the Muslim
tradition combines them with the directives of the Sunnah.
In his 1970s book, Muhammad al-Nuwayahi, a leading Islamic scholar,
explains that "Islam does not grant any special group or person
the right to monopolize interpretation of its teachings or the representation
of the community of Muslims … some binding Qur'anic laws at
the time of the Prophet were eliminated in later periods, even as
late as the period of the second caliph. Thus, legislation concerning
worldly affairs was not meant to be eternal, literal or unchangeable.
The principle of Hurf ('community interest') is
at the root of all Islamic legislation."18
[19] In the Islamic sciences, Qura'nic verses are not taken at face
value. Traditional Muslim scholars have agreed that a correct interpretation
of the Qur'an is either by the Qur'an itself or by Sunnah,
the tradition of the prophet Muhammad and his companions. The science
of interpreting the Qur'an "At-tafsir" has been
one of the most exclusive avenues of Islamic sciences. It requires
scholarly understanding of Arabic hermeneutics, and the biography
of the prophet of Islam, Sirah. A popular Hadith (saying
of the prophet of Islam) reads, "Whoever interprets the Qur'an
intellectually is wrong even if he appears to be correct."19 Interpretation
of any given verse in the Qur'an is only valid if there is a Daleel,
which means precedent example from Sunnah, to support that
view. There are two sciences that need to be incorporated in interpreting
the Qur'an: first, Al-nasekh wal Mansoukh (the science of
abrogation), which enables a reader to understand the verses in the
holy Qur'an that have been invalidated and abrogated by other verses.
Second, Sababu an-Nuzul (occasion of revelation), which helps
a reader determine the period in which each verse or chapter of the
Qur'an was revealed, thus understanding the circumstances for its
revelation. These two sciences are fundamental in understanding the
historical circumstances of the life of the prophet of Islam—the
attribute of each period of his life is evident from the verses revealed
in that period, whether in war or peace.
[20] Second, saying that the Qur'an itself promotes violence by using
the word Kuffar ("infidels") with reference to non-Muslims
is antithetical to Muslim popular tradition. The term Kuffar is
from the Arabic root word Kaffara, which means "bury
something in the ground/cover." Etymologically, the structure
of the word Kuffar means those who bury/cover. Although many
verses of the Qur'an call ahlul kitab (Jews and Christians) kuffar,
as they objected to or suppressed the message of Islam during the
time of the Prophet, most Muslim scholars consider this as only referring
to those who fought against Islam when it was presented to them by
the prophet of Islam. As the word Muslims is used in the Qur'an
to describe Jews, Christians and Muslim alike, the word Kuffar is
also used to describe the vigorous rejection of Islam at the time
of its inception. In Islamic tradition, the word Kuffar has
not been used to address others in the sense of ideological pejorative
or name-calling. Hassan Hathan has noted, "As matter of fact,
the term "infidel"[as it is used to translate the term Kuffar]
is of European origin used at the time of the Crusades to describe
Muslims."20 The Qur'an
rejects name-calling,21 and
never allowed forced conversion of other people because that contradicts
the universality and inclusiveness of the Islamic message.22 Throughout
premodern history, Jews and Christians as minorities in Muslim societies
were granted citizenship rights under a national pact ('ahd)
that dictates their rights as Dhimmis ("protectees").
This pact granted them protection under the law, security of life
and property, and their places of worship, in exchange for paying Jizya ("tax")
on mutually agreed upon terms. In non-Muslim societies,
Bernard Lewis explains, "During eight centuries of Muslim rule
in Spain both Judaism and Christianity survived and in some limited
measure flourished … The Muslim states, both in old and in
newly conquered Muslim realms, were more tolerant."23
[21] Islamic history is rampant with examples of tolerance and acceptance
being depicted as wisdom and virtue. After the conquest of Mecca
in 630 C.E., the Prophet destroyed all the idols in the Ka'ba,
except an icon of the Virgin Mary and a painting of the prophet Ibrahim.24 Another
example is when the second caliph Umar Ibn Qattab conquered
Jerusalem. He refused to pray in the Church of Ascension, knowing
that if he had done so, the Muslims would convert the church to a
mosque.
Muslim Intellectual Tradition and the Interpretation
of the Qur'an
[22] A close reading of the four most revered books in the science
of interpretation of the Qur'an reveals that Muslim scholars have
used a simplistic interpretation of Islam when addressing people
of other faiths. Ismael ibn Kathir, a fourteenth century scholar,25 Ibn
Jareer Al-Tabari, a tenth century scholar,26 Imam
Al-Qurtubi, a thirteenth century scholar, 27 and
As-shawkani, a sixteenth century scholar,28 have
all suggested a peaceful and harmonious attitude toward non-Muslims,
and did not use the term Kuffar as synonymous with infidel. Their
interpretation of the meanings of the Qur'an has centred on an approach
that looks at the teachings of Islam as a faith not a territory,
through verses of the Qur'an that promote respect, and justice toward
others such as "there is no compulsion in matters of religion,"29 and "bear
witness to the truth in all equity and never let hatred of others
lead you to deviate from Justice. Be just for this is closest to
righteousness. Remember God is well aware of all that you do."30 There
is also a common call for the imperative of cooperation between the
races based on the Qur'anic verse "Oh, Mankind! We created
you from a single soul, male and female, and made you into nations
and tribes, so that you may come to know one another [not to despise
each other]. Truly, the most honored of you in God's sight is the
one who is most righteous." 31
[23] Leading jurists in Islamic criminology such as Imam Abu Hanifa
(700-768), Abu Yusuf (731-803), and their contemporary jurist Imam
Abu Layla, considered equal treatment between Muslims and non-Muslims
an absolute fact in Islamic jurisprudence. They draw their arguments
from the last sermon of the Prophet in 632, C.E. In their views,
this sermon made it clear that "All humankind is from Adam and
Eve. An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab, and a non-Arab has
no superiority over an Arab. A white person has no superiority over
a black person, and a black person has no superiority over a white
person, except by piety and righteous actions."32
[24] Drawing on this tradition, modern Muslim public intellectuals
extend the concept of ahl-al-Dhimm, "people of covenant,
which is traditionally limited to Jews and Christians," to include
any non-Muslims, Sabeans, Zoroastrians, Buddhists, etc., who chose
to reside in a Muslim land.33 Non-Muslims
are accorded the same rights as those of Muslims. Contemporary Muslim
social and educational institutions such as the Muslim World League,
Al Azar University, and the Pakistani Council of Ulama "scholars" have
all endorsed the rights of non-Muslims in any Muslim society. Rashid
Ganoushi, an exiled public intellectual from Tunisia, notes that "It
is the consensus of opinion among modern Muslims scholars that non-Muslims
in modern Islamic states can even criticize Islam itself freely and
praise their own religion."34
[25] Moreover, modern Muslim scholars have rejected the notion of "clash
of civilizations" as it is used to describe the relationship
between Islam and the West. In a lengthy critical article, Dr. Quasim
Abdu Qasim, a famous Egyptian historian, dismisses the idea of "clash
of civilization" because it simply contradicts the universality
of Islam.35 Speaking in the
name of Arab and Muslim public intellectuals, Dr. Sulaiman I. Al-Askari
of Kuwait calls for an intellectual dialogue between the two sides
rather than misinterpretation of religion. Terrorism, in his view,
is as dangerous to Islam as it is to world order and harmony. It
is rooted in corrupt groups and individuals, and unjust policies
in the world, and has nothing to do with the Islamic tradition.36
Conclusion
[26] In sum, a thoughtful look into terrorism that are perpetrated
in the name of Islam through historical and political contexts would
see its roots in contemporary corrupt politics and fanatical ideologies,
rather than in the Islamic teachings. Alain Krueger and Jitka Maleckova
of Princeton University have made a definite point in their study
of the roots of terrorism as correlated with despotic political regimes
and self-serving ideologies.37 Practices
associated with political oppression and ideological corruption are
the results of colonial subjugation, intellectual stagnation and
wrong priorities—and have little to do with Islam. A proper
and comprehensive interpretation of the Muslim faith based on its
popular and intellectual traditions would not find it as the root
cause of the terrorism that we are continuing to face.
Notes
1 Comments made on NBC Nightly News, November 19, 2001.
2 Remarks made during Robertson's "700
Club" television program with co-host, Lee Webb, on February
21, 2002. Also see Alain Cooperman, Washington Post, February
22, 2002.
3 See Bernard Lewis's views in The
Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: Modern
Library, 2003). Also read his May 2003 article in The Atlantic
Monthly, "I'm Right, You're Wrong, Go to Hell."
4 Read, for instance, his New
York Post article "Convert to Violence," October
25, 2002.
5 Jonah Goldberg, "the Goldberg
File" In the New Republic, October 1, 2001.
6 Albert Hourani, Arab Thought
in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1970).
7 See Mbaye Lo, Muslims in
America: Race, Politics and Community Building (Beltsville,
MD: Amana Publications, 2004), 134.
8 See for instance, Inthe
Shade of the Qur'an: Sura al-Shura (chapter 42 of the Qur'an).
9 See John Esposito, The Islamic
Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press,
1992), 135.
10 Daniel Benjamin and Steven
Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America (New
York: Random House, 2002), 62.
11 See Muhammad Ibn Abdurrahman
Al Makhrawi, Al- Mufassirun (Interpreters of the Qu'ran),
vol. 2 (Riyadh: Dar Tayyiba, 1985), 319.
12 George Crile, Charlie
Wilson's War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003).
13 See these forms in Bukhai's
collection of Hadith (sayings and tradition of the prophet
of Islam), Sahihu-l Bukhari, which is the most common and
accepted source of Hadith. Volume 1 has 241 chapters under
the title of Jihad; the English version is in volume 4 (34-275). Sahih
Muslim, which is the second most common source of Hadith,
has 100 chapters under the title of Jihad; the English version
is in volume 3 (942-1063).
14 This is the official Fatwa of
all Muslim educational institutions in the Muslim world as well as
in the Muslim diaspora. It is based on a story that upon the Prophet's
return from a battle he said, "We have returned from the lesser
jihad to the greater jihad [the struggle against the evil of one's
soul]." In Tarikh al Baghadadi, vol. 13, 493.
15 See interpretations of the
Qu'ran 22:39-40.
16 This quotation is from his
May 14, 2003 address to the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, Cleveland,
Ohio.
17 Said Aburish, A Brutal
Friendship: the West and the Arab Elite (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1997) 14-15.
18 M. al-Nuwayahi, Nahwa athawra
fi-l fikri al-dini (Toward New Religious Thought), (Beirut:
Dar al-adab, 1970).
19 This is an authentic Hadith that
has been related in the main sources of Abudawud, At-tirmizi
and An-nisa'i.
20Hassan Hathan, Reading
the Muslim Mind (Indiana: American Trust Publication, 1998),
15.
21 Qur'an: 4:148; 17:53; 28:
55.
22 Qur'an: 21: 107; 2: 256.
23 Bernard Lewis, The Multiple
Identities of the Middle East (New York: Schocken Books, 1998),
116-17.
24 This story is mentioned by
Abu Al-Walid Al-Azraqi (d. 845) in his book Akhbar Makkah [News
of Mecca] (Cairo: Maktabat Mustapha al-Babi al-Halabi, 138), vol.
2, 160. And also see Martin Lings, Muhammad: His Life Based
on the Earliest Sources (Rochester, VT.: Inner Traditions International,
1983), 300.
25 Ismael Ibn Kathir, The
Commentary of the Glorious Qur'an (Cairo: Mu-assasatu Al-Mukhtar
Linashri wa-tawzi), 2001.
26 Ibn Jareer At-Tabari, Jaami-ul-Bayaan (Cairo: Tabaha
Publications, 1967).
27 Muhammad Al-Qurttubi, Al-Jaami'u
li-Ahkaamil-Qur'an (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Masriyah, 1959).
28 Imam As-shawkani, Fathul
Qadir (Damascus: Al Matbah Al-Ilmiyyah, 1976).
29 Qur'an 2:256.
30 Qur'an 5:8.
31 Qur'an 49:13.
32 All versions of the sermon
are available in several traditional sources as Al-Bukhari and Al-Muslim. Also
read Muhammad Al-khudari's book, Nuru-alyaqin (Beirut: Darul-Jabal,
1987), 305.
33 See Rashid Gannouchi, "The
Rights of Non-Muslims in a Muslim State," in The Message
International (New York: ICNA Publications, April-May 2004),
27.
34 Gannouchi, "Rights," 27
35 See Alarabi Magazine,
published by Ministry of Information of the state of Kuwait, January
2004 edition.
36 Alarabi Magazine, July
2004 edition.
37 Alan B. Krueger and Jitka
Maleckova, "Seeking the Roots of Terrorism," Chronicle
of Higher Education (June 6, 2003).
