From: IN%"bjarne.braastad@nlh10.nlh.no" 5-APR-1994 04:28:15.04 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Pre-print reviewing Dear all, I want to draw your attention to another possibility for this network, since I don't think that Rushen or Stookey have mentioned it. Scientists could copy to the network a final draft of their article intended for submission to a journal. Then all those interested and particularly those working in the field of the article could comment upon the draft before it is sent to the journal. In this way the quality of the printed articles could be improved, and the processing through the referee system in the journal would go easier and quicker. This would be of benefit to us all. This is being done at some other networks. The copy of the draft to the network should not be regarded as publishing, so the article could be submitted as previously unpublished. I look forward to any response on this idea. Bjarne O. Braastad Dept. Animal Sci., Agric. Univ. Norway, Aas, Norway =============================================================================== From: IN%"GONYOU@sask.usask.ca" 6-APR-1994 08:35:19.22 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Regional meeting in North America Those of you who are members of the ISAE in North America should have received a preliminary notice of a joint U.S. and Canada regional meeting to be held in Guelph on June 4-5. This message is to provide additional information about the meeting and its purpose. The results of the survey I conducted about a year ago indicate that we about equally divided as to whether we should meet as a separate group or in conjunction with other societies. There was also a lack of consensus on the time of year that would be best for a meeting. It was clear that in terms of travel, The Toronto or Chicago areas were most central. Guelph is within a day's drive of the majority of our members. There are approximately 50 ISAE members in North America, but we rarely have the opportunity to meet together due to the lack of a meeting that is of interest to all of us. The meeting in Guelph is intended to provide such a meeting, and allow us to determine how to best function as a group in the future. Part of the day will be dedicated to this discussion. Bo Algers, from Skara, Sweden, will be with us to describe how the Nordic region of the ISAE functions. Some of the issues which are likely to be discussed are: whether we should retain two regions (Canada and U.S.) or form a single North American region; the relationship between the ISAE and its regions; the possibility of regular regional meetings and if these should be held in association with other societies; and selecting our regional secretaries who will represent us at ISAE Council meetings. Your input is needed if we are to develop a cohesive group within North America. In addition to the discussion on the functioning of our region(s), we will have a number of free papers. I would urge you to submit titles to Tina Widowski as soon as possible. This is an excellent opportunity for graduate students to present material and interact with others in their field. It may also be used to introduce new lines of research. The meeting was scheduled to follow a workshop on animal welfare sponsored by Canada'a Expert Committee on Farm Animal Behaviour and Welfare. All ISAE members are invited to attend that meeting as well. The program includes the following presentations: Involvement of the Canadian Federation of Humane Societies in the Development and Implementation of the Codes of Practice (Joy Ripley, Canadian Federation of Humane Societies). International trade and Animal Welfare (Weldon Newton, Canadian Pork Council). History and Current State of Animal Welfare in Canada (Jim Johnstone, Egg Producer, former director of Ontario Farm Animal Council). Human Obligations for Care and Welfare of Farm Animals (Frank Hurnik, University of Guelph). Animal Welfare and Swedish Agriculture (Bo Algers, Skara, Sweden). Humane transportation of Farm Animals (Gordon Doonan, Agriculture Canada). Pre-slaughter Handling and Humane Slaughter of Farm Animals (Larry Campbell, Canadian Meats Council). Role of Governments, Humane Movement and Industry in Promoting Animal Welfare (Tom Hughes, Canadian Farm Animal Care Trust). Scientific Assessment of Animal Welfare (Anne Marie de Passille and Jeff Rushen, Agriculture Canada) Alternative Housing Systems for Farm Animals (Harold Gonyou, Prairie Swine Centre) Codes of Practice and Future Directions (Jim Dalrymple, Canada Committee on Animals). Summary and Conclusions (David Fraser, Agriculture Canada). You may contact Tina Widowski if you are planning to attend, or if you would like more information. Her e-mail address is twidowski@APS.UoGuelph.ca. Please pass this information along to others who may be interested. Harold Gonyou ============================================================================ From: IN%"NEWBERRY@BCRSAG.AGR.CA" 7-APR-1994 09:49:59.12 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Behavioural ecology - forwarded from ethology network From: OTTGW::IN%"ETHOLOGY%SEARN.BITNET@SEGATE.SUNET.SE" "Ethology" 6-APR-1994 17:46:08.37 To: IN%"ETHOLOGY%SEARN.BITNET@SEGATE.SUNET.SE" "Multiple recipients of list ETHOLOGY" In article , Pierre Alain Cotnoir wrote: > But i deplore that for now a > good number of ethologist are more interested by ecology than by biological > perspectives of behavior. Well, I am a ethologist/behavioral ecologist(even have a job!) and I can no longer see how ANYONE can study behavior without reference to ecology AND underlying mechanisms. Behavioral ecology basically is ethology done the way Darwin did it - study the evolution and adaptive design of phenotypes (behaviors) in the selective environment (ecological and social) they occur (occured) in. The European ethologists also considered themseleves intellectual descendents of Darwin. Problem was that only Tinbergen came close to understanding how evolution and behavior were related (that ought to provoke some flames...). Lorenz and others were very much interested in how things worked for the good of the species and Von Frisch and his students basically ignored many important ecological parameters in their studies (see J. Gould's experiements and reviews and T. Seeley's work for a view of what the ecology adds to our understanding of bee ethology). > Or is it the main current of ethology that had > been perverted by behavioral ecology in a manner that now people do more > ecological than behavioral studies? Perverted is strong language. Just how has studying behavior in regard to its ecological (selective) environment perverted ethology? That is what Lorenz and Tinbergen did (they predated the modern ecological and evolutionary theory). Or are you suggesting that ethology works better in some sort of behaviorist vacuum? Let's take one of many examples. Learning in rats. Was Skinner wrong about the universality of operant conditioning because he ignored the ecology and evolution of rats? I think so and so must Garcia who clearly pointed out that what rats do learn makes sense in the context of where and how they live (ecology). Those of us who have found a home in the part of animal behavior called behavioral ecology did so because of the amazing transitions that occured in the early 70's in how much more we can understand about behavior by looking at it in a larger context. Finally, let me clarify a potential misunderstanding. Behavioral ecology is not about ecology but about the evolution of behavior. The ecology part is the selective environment (weather, other species, the behavior of others of the same species) in which behavior evolves. The underlying mechanisms and genetic and developmental bases for behavior are an essential part of the story as is the selective environment. Perhaps that is why behavioral ecologists still wonder over how many grown men argued so foolishly for either innate or learned when it is clear (even in Darwin's writings) that the answer must always be, "It depends ...". Doesn't ecology have something to do with the "depends". Jonathan Waage Evolutionary biologist with ecology background who does empirical studies of insect behavior in the field. What am I??? From: Jonathan Waage ========================================================================== From: IN%"@cunyvm.cuny.edu:VUZV1@CSEARN.BITNET" "Marek Spinka" 13-APR-1 To: IN%"Applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" "Applied Ethology" CC: Subj: nursing synchro Dear all, Let me, out of synchrony, present another idea why grouped pigs may synchronize their nursings. It is known that free-ranging sows forage in their stable groups of 3-5 for about 85% of their active time. A nursing lasts some 5 to 10 minutes. Sows nurse each hour or more frequently. If each sow would nurse independently of the others, either all sows must wait whenever one of them suckles, and the group would hardly move forward, or they do not wait, and the group gets scatter during its daily routine. May be coffee breaks at ISAE congresses are synchronized not because ethologists have a dangerous drive to drink all the available coffee whenever they are allowed to, but because they want to stay together during the lectures. What a fun this story telling!! Marek =============================================================================== From: IN%"APN6MAV@SOUTH-01.NOVELL.LEEDS.AC.UK" "VARLEY M.A." 13-APR-1994 08: To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Synchronised Sucking ! The real reason that ISAE delegates rush in synchrony to coffee breaks at meetings is that they all drank in synchrony at the bar the night before and therefore their dehydration/headaches are in synchrony too. The serious point is that in interpretations of this kind many confounding factors can cloud the beer. I believe that synchronised suckling is simply a natural survival mechanism working between family groups to allow the best family genotypes a survival advantage. Those families spreading out the avialable milk best will leave more genes etc. The way they can do this best is to evenly spread out milk over the course of the whole lactation and all the piglets rather than to allow only a few 'good suckers' within the whole family group to get a disproortionate share of the goodies with a concomitant decrease in overall survival of the family group. Good sucking Mike Varley ================================================================================ From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN, AGRICULTURE CANADA, IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: synchro-suckers Even ignoring Mike Varley's slanderous comments about evening activites at ISAE meetings (you should see what they do at Reproductive Biology meetings!), his logic does not bear scrutiny. He makes two assumptions. The first, is that synchronized nursings will spread the available milk around to all piglets in the family group. Surely, it is the other way round. A sow with a poor milk supply would be better of NOT nursing when her sisters nurse. This would allow her piglets to try to cross-suckle off the better sows. Synchronized nursing would reduce cross-suckling and therefore not result in more evenly spread out milk. The second assumption is that it is in the interest of the family to ensure an even distribution of the milk rather than letting it all go to the best piglets. Consider the following situation with two family groups "A" and "B", each with three sister sows, each with 8 piglets and each with one sow who produces no milk and so cannot feed her own piglets. In group A, the other two sows are altruistic and allow all the piglets to suckle, not just there own. 24 piglets might survive to weaning but all will be 2/3 of the normal body weight since they have drunk the milk from only two sows. In group B, the sows are not altruistic and refuse to let the piglets from the non-productive sow to nurse from them. The 8 piglets from this sow will die so this family group has only 16 piglets at weaning. However, these piglets will be 1.5 times the size of famil group A (since two sows milk only went to feed 16 not 24 piglets). If the environment in which they live has enough resources for only 10 pigs to reproduce (say) then only the pigs of group B will reproduce (since this size difference in body weight will almost certainly guarantee (statistically) success at competition. I know there are many assumptions in this arguement but can anyone see a fault in the logic? Jeff Rushen (I apologize to you all if this email prompts Ian Duncan to start going on about Rudyard Kipling and camels again). ============================================================================= From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN, AGRICULTURE CANADA, To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: How synchronized are they? Before we get too much into this speculation, I would like to know just how synchronized sows are in their nursings? I know everyone says that they are, and I agree that it is not uncommon for the sounds of one sow nursing to stimulate others to begin nursing. However, I have been in farrowing rooms many times and seen only one sow (out of a large group) nursing. Thus the degree of synchrony does not seem nearly as tight as Marek seems to suggest. Does any one know of any data which quatifies the degree of synchrony that exists among pigs, especially those kept outdoors? Jeff Rushen ============================================================================== From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN, AGRICULTURE CANADA, To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: is behavioural ecology of any use? No. The recent comments on nursing synchrony in sows have shown the extent to which applied ethologists have begun to concern themselves with the "function" of the bahviour of farm animals. This corresponds with comments by Ian Horrell (in the ISAE newsletter a while back) and others that applied ethology should "modernize" itself by adopting the questions and methods of behavioural ecology. However, I am not at all persuaded by these arguements and believe that behavioural ecology is of little value to applied ethologists and results in only idle speculation. First, behavioural ecology and concern about the function of behaviour is hardly "modern". It was part of Tinbergens approach and became predominant in the late 70s and early 80s when it threatened to overwhelm the rest of ethology. However, its time has come and gone, and while functional approaches to behaviour cleary are of interest to many, the most exciting, recent developments in understanding behaviour are occuring at the level of neurosciences and cognitive ethology. It would be ironic if we tried to modernize applied ethology by trying to adopt an already out-moded approach. Second, of the four approaches to studying behaviour outlined by Tinbergen (i.e. the causal, developmental, evolutionary and functional), the functional approach is the least useful to applied ethology. Understanding the causal (including cognitive and neurological) basis of behaviour, and how it develops should be our main business. Knowing the evolutionary background of the behaviours helps put them in some context. However, to understand the function of behaviour we need to know, with some precision, what were the selective pressures operating on the species throughout recent evolution. We have no way of knowing this for farm animals, and we have no way of knowing how recent artificial selection has altered the behaviour. Thus, speculation about the functions of farm animal behaviour is idle, and simply distracts us. so there! Jeff Rushen ============================================================================= From: IN%"IDUNCAN@APS.UoGuelph.CA" 13-APR-1994 15:24:53.75 To: IN%"Applied-Ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Behavioural ecology ".......and so, best beloved, that is how the camel got its hump - and why all the little pigs suck together." So, even Jeff Rushen prefers the Kipling version! This is unexpected support! Come on you behavioural ecology wannabes try switching from Krebs and Davies to Rudyard Kipling. He's much more original - and entertaining! Ian Duncan =============================================================================== From: IN%"alp18@cus.cam.ac.uk" "Dr A.L. Podberscek" 14-APR-1994 04:54:49.28 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: ISAE Congress Dear Network Readers, While writing my abstract for this years ISAE Congress I found myself umming and arring as to whether or not I had a hope in hell of having my abstract accepted as a spoken paper. This is because my work (applied companion animal behaviour) does not fit into the theme which embraces this years Congress. I realise there is is a free papers session but this seems little more than a token gesture to those who can't fit into the other categories. Which brings me to the question - Why does ISAE try and theme its international meetings? Shouldn't it be encouraging all members and even non-members to come together once a year to share in the latest research in applied ethology? Most people (especially students) cannot get funding to these conferences unless they are presenting a paper or poster. Therefore the Congress needs to be much more open and more inviting to all members. Categories for the sessions can be determined after the abstracts have been collected. It is quite fine to theme the regional meetings as they have a much smaller audience and few people travel large distances to attend them. Perhaps this idea has been discussed previously at ISAE meetings and I apologise if I am merely rolling out the same old chestnut. However, if it hasn't, what do other people think? I noticed that the Exeter conference has a session on companion animal behaviour and human-animal interactions. Shouldn't this be included every year - it doesn't really need to be said. Just because the majority of ISAE members work on farm animal behaviour doen't mean that other species should be excluded - the membership of ISAE would be increased if the society showed a greater interest in other species. I'm typing faster now which means that I'm getting pissed off- so I'd better stop. Perhaps I'm just ranting and raving because I had two flat tyres today, I don't know, but I hope that my comments are of some interest. Sincerely and cheerfully, Anthony Podberscek PS I hope I have not offended the organisers of either the Denmark or Exeter conferences - apologies if I have. ============================================================================== From: IN%"APN6MAV@SOUTH-01.NOVELL.LEEDS.AC.UK" "VARLEY M.A." 14-APR-1994 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Synchronised Suckers Dear All The debate sucks on !! I have never seen any data on the proportion or degree of synchrony of suckling behaviour but Peter English in Aberdeen will have it if anyone has. My own experience over too many years is that in a 'normal' farrowing house situation, they do synchronise to the tune of about 80-90% of cases. This is also time dependant and it may take about a week into lactation for the whole group before synchronisation really begins. It is also dependant on the time of the day and if there are many disturbances (stockpersons activities etc.) then this will also prevent synchrony. There will also be those dumbo sows who always do their own thing. Canadian sows may include more dumbos than English sows who have been bred to perfection by our hybrid companies for optimum reproductive attitudes!!: It does occur to me that the whole phenomenum is a pure biological artefact induced by our intervention. Under outdoor conditions (UK currently has 25 % of all sows accommodated outdoors) the sows have actually less synchrony. My farmer friends tell me that as they are in their own separate little huts, they suckle as and when they want and not dependent on the other huts. This 'welfare friendly' way of keeping pigs is also far from the natural habitat of course and in real family groups the sows would be in much close contact with their respective litters. My hat off to Jeff Rushen's logic lesson. I am however still not convinced as he has given some interesting numbers to illustrate the point all of which may be way out and therefore the argument swings back. In particular, I wonder what the incidence or proportion of altruistic sows is ?? I am not sure. We have just completed a 3 year project on sow emotionality/personality/disposition to classify and study individualistic behaviours in mature sows but sadly this is one behavioural aspect we did not look at. I would suspect that a rather small percentage will naturally show this behaviour and therefore my original selection of family- genotype argument will still hold. G'day from Leeds Mike Varley ============================================================================= From: IN%"@cunyvm.cuny.edu:VUZV1@CSEARN.BITNET" "Marek Spinka" 14-APR-1994 To: IN%"Applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" "Applied Ethology" CC: Subj: piglet weight, milk intake & growth Dear all, Does anybody know about data which would answer the following question. Within a litter of differently sized sucking piglets, is there any relationship between individual body weight and individual efficiency in converting milk to body mass? And if so, are the heavier siblings more efficient users of the ingested milk, or the lighter ones? In order to answer the question, a set of data containing the following would be needed: for each piglet, its INDIVIDUAL body weight at the beginning of the measured time period, its INDIVIDUAL milk intake during this period, and its INDIVIDUAL body weight at the end of the period. It does not matter whether the milk intake was estimated by the weigh-suckle- weigh method or by feeding the piglets milk replacer artificially. I feel that such a data set must have been already collected, but until now, I was unable to get one. The published data on artificial rearing usually give average consumptions for several piglets, and are hence useless for my question. I would appreciate any information concerning this problem, Marek Spinka ============================================================================== From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN, AGRICULTURE CANADA, To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: behavioural ecology sucks- synchronously! Ian Duncan writes: "So, even Jeff Rushen prefers the Kipling version!" This is not quite true, even though I agree with the spirit behand the comments (Glenfiddich perhaps?). Krebs, Dawkins et al. deserve credit mainly for raising the scientific rigour of speculation about functionality of behaviour beyond that of kiplingesque story telling. They were able to do this for three reasons. 1. They were careful about what level Darwinian natural selection operated (i.e. at the individual, kingroup or possibly gene level rather than at the group or species level. I am not sure that applied ethologists speculating about functions appreciate this point. 2. They were able to determine and quantify what the actual selective pressures were operating on a given species in its environment of adaptation. This is difficult to achieve for wild animals, but it is impossible for farm animals. This makes speculation about function of farm animal behaviour "kiplingesque". 3. They carried out experimental studies to test out fairly precise predictions based on their hypotheses about the function. Instead of carrying out such experiments on farm animals (which in any case would be impossible to do because of reason 2 above) applied ethologists simply speculate. Thus, while I prefer K+D to Kipling, I prefer the latter to attempts to discuss function of farm animal behaviour. To stress my main point, the approaches of behavioural ecology, while undoubtedly of intellectual interest, and not particularly relevent to applied ethology, the main business of which should be to understand the causal (motivational, cognitive, neurphysiological) and developmental basis of behaviour. Jeff Rushen ============================================================================== From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN, AGRICULTURE CANADA, To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: from J. P. Signoret From: OTTGW::IN%"signoret@tours.inra.fr" 14-APR-1994 05:36:39.36 To: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" CC: Subj: RE: How synchronized are they? A student of me has observed social and maternal behavioour in european wild boars : cross suckling occurs only when piglets of different ages coexist in the female herd. In fact this is normally exceptionel, as spontaneous synchro- nization of oestrus and farrowing has been observed. (published in J. Reprod. Fert, 1990, 89, 613-617). Cases of spontaneous fostering of older pivglets by a sow having farrowed later than the other have been observed. In this case the resident youngs are eliminated bu the older intrudents and dies subsequently This has been reproduced experimentally in keeping desynchronized wild sows in pens communicating for youngs only. This is under submission for publication. This results from the high maternal tolerance for faliliar but alien piglets what is present wigthin a herd of wild (and domestic?) sowws. In natural condi- tions this could have a functional significance allowing the survival of the offspring of the "normal" and better adapted sow in case of problem from the dam another possibility would be to allow survival after accidental of the dam. This is an original case of helpers as observed in birds when members of a group or a family cooperate to feed youngs. It could have a significance in the sociobiological hypothesis, as the females of a social unit of wild pigs are generally related by matriarchal origin. However, this is an artefact, as in experimental conditions, it works perfectly well among unrelated females. Could you comment about taht? J.P. Signoret ============================================================================= From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 17-APR-1994 13:18:57.75 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: animal rights conference (forwarded) From: OTTGW::IN%"DLEAHY@delphi.com" "Debbie Leahy" 16-APR-1994 08:33:57.64 To: IN%"ar-news@cygnus.com" CC: Subj: NAA Conference National Alliance for Animals P.O. Box 77591 Washington, DC 20013-7591 Phone: 703/837-1203 Fax: 703/837-1452 NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR ANIMALS presents our Seventh Annual International Animal Rights Symposium July 8-10, 1994 Washington Dulles Marriott INTERNATIONAL SPONSOR: British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection SPONSORED IN PART BY: American Anti-Vivisection Society The Animals' Agenda Elephant Alliance Humane Society of the U.S. National Anti-Vivisection Society FEATURING: Carol Adams, Cleveland Amory, Don Barnes, Michael W. Fox, Gary Francione, Holly Hazard, Marjorie Kramer, Andrew Linzey, Jim Mason, Steve McIvor, Ingrid Newkirk, Richard O'Barry, Wayne Pacelle, Alex Pacheco, Tom Regan, Zoe Weil. OTHER INVITED SPEAKERS: David Suzuki, Carl Sagan, Neal Barnard, Jan Hartke, Karen Davis, Batya Bauman, Ginnie Bee, Marc Wessels, Syndee L'ome Grace, Larry Carter, Kim Stallwood, Lori Bauston, Kim Sturla, Ken Shapiro, Florence Lambert, Virginia Handley, Greta Garrd, Karin Gabrielson, Roberta Kalechofski, Howard Lyman, David Brower, Sam LaBudde, Mike Baker, Gill Langley, Peter Gerard. SYMPOSIUM HIGHLIGHTS: - 50 nationally and international recognized speakers. - dozens of workshops and keynote addresses advising you on: status of animal rights and environmental issues; strategies for success; how to use the political process to help animals. - educational videos - pure vegetarian meals - live entertainment - time for sightseeing in our nation's capital The National Alliance for Animals is the organizer of the historic 1990 March for the Animals. PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE: Symposium registration will begin at 8:00 am on Friday, July 8th and will continue until Sunday, July 10th at noon. Workshops will begin on Friday at 10:00 am and will run throughout the day on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. Plenary sessions will begin Friday afternoon and will run through Friday evening and all day on Saturday and Sunday. The symposium will end with a one hour plenary session beginning at 5:00 pm on Sunday, July 10th. The NAA Awards Banquet will be held Saturday evening. REGISTRATION FEES: before May 1, 1994 $89.00 before May 31, 1994 $115.00 after May 31, 1994 $150.00 Full-time students (proof required) $65.00 Senior Citizens (60 yrs or older) $65.00 Please enclose check or money order. Visa and Mastercard accepted. ACCOMMODATIONS/TRAVEL: The Washington Dulles Marriott Hotel is located less than five minutes from Washington Dulles International Airport and about thirty minutes from Washington National Airport. The hotel provides complimentary shuttle service to and from Washington Dulles International Airport and to nearby shopping centers and health clubs. A shuttle to and from Washington National Airport is also available for a small fee. The Washington Dulles Marriott is offering an incredible symposium rate of only $65.00 per room (single or double occupancy). This rate is about thirty dollars per room less than the conference rate participants received in 1991! Reservations may be made by calling 800/228-9290 or 703/471-9500. You must indicate that you are attending the National Alliance for Animals symposium to receive the discounted rate. Rooms must be reserved by June 21, 1994. The NAA has arranged special discount conference rates with major airlines through All Ways Travel. Discounts apply only when you call All Ways Travel at 800/783-8990 or 301/229-1600 (ask for Donna). ============================================================================ From: IN%"signoret@tours.inra.fr" 18-APR-1994 08:36:07.68 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: streotypies in sows during field observations dealing with different sustems of housing of sows we have observed in sows groupes in pens with straw repetitive straw chewing together with vacuum chewing. what these items have a place compared with the "classical" stereotypies other repetitive activities. could we imagine that straw chewing and rooting of natural soil by sows could have a similar role as bar biting for insdtance in feed restricted animals as our sows are? could you comment on this? yours J.P. Signorat and Caroline Vieuille. ============================================================================= From: IN%"ESA117@ESAVAX.EDINBURGH.AC.UK" 20-APR-1994 05:08:43.67 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" "APPLIED-ETHOLOGY" CC: Subj: straw-chewing in sows Perhaps we need to expand our traditional picture of 'classical' stereotypy from that of the bar-biting sow. Burbidge et al (ISAE Berlin 1993) also observed excessive straw-chewing in sows after feeding, and also showed that it occurred in the same time-period after feeding as sows without straw chewed chains etc. Excessive straw-chewing (or rock-chewing, which apparently occurs in outdoor sows) ceratinly fits the Fraser and Broom (1990) definition of 'a repeated, relatively invariant sequence of movements which has no obvious purpose'. Regards, Marie Haskell, Edinburgh ============================================================================== From: IN%"PELLE@hhyg.slu.se" 21-APR-1994 14:51:02.29 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: This is a comment on issues raised mainly by Jeff Rushen concerning the use of behavioural ecology in applied ethology. Whereas I agree that the main issue for applied ethology is to increase understanding of causal mechanisms, I think we have a lot to learn from the type of research provided by behavioural ecologists. What behavioural ecology is NOT (as far as I see it) is just-so stories like the ones of Kipling. Contrary, the last decades of behavioural ecology has introduced careful modelling and mathematical prediction into behavioural science. Precisely what scientific good theoretical contributions in the same class as that can you claim has come out of applied ethology? If any part of behavioural science is full of speculations and badly verified reasoning, I would say applied ethology is that part. Look at welfare research, for example. Where are the precisely defined terms and the rigid predictions? Before we accuse behavioural ecology of being speculative and un-modern, we should come up with a few examples of our own of how research should really be done. In think we will find ourselves in difficulties there. Not only the superior methodology of predicting from rigid, quantitative models and evaluating from a combination of field and experimental data makes behavioural ecology an interesting area for us applied people. I simply do not agree with Jeff Rushen that functional knowledge of a behaviour is of no value for the causal studies. In fact, evolution will have shaped a behavioural mechanism in relation to a function. The functional context of a behaviour will help us understand the design of the causal mechanisms. It may even be impossible to understand some mechanisms unless we know the functional background of the behaviour. An example comes from suckling in pigs: If we want to understand in detail, e g, the mechanisms controlling the different phases of a normal suckling, this would be strongly facilitated if we knew the functional aspects of these phases. Or in hens: Understanding the group dynamics of hens in different systems should benefit a lot from knowledge of social strategies in free-living fowl. Contrary to Jeff Rushen, I believe that the selective forces acting on farm animals are far more accessible than for most wild animals. With the right approach, I think it would be perfectly possible to quantify selection factors with a much higher precision than what is possible in most other species, and in fact, behavioural ecologists should be more interested in farm animals. I would also not suspect that the last 100 years or so of intensive breeding programs would have altered the basic designs of the mechanisms in any conceivable way. Therefore, I think it is perfectly valid to discuss evolutionary and functional backgrounds of farm animal behaviour - at least as valid as for any other species. So: We need continued discussions of functional aspects of farm animal behaviour in order to fully appreciate the mechanisms. However, story-telling is not fruitful in the long run either for farm or wild animals. What we need is rigid modelling providing some good testable hypotheses. Best wishes Per Jensen ============================================================================== From: IN%"PELLE@hhyg.slu.se" 22-APR-1994 01:35:08.33 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Subject: Animal Welfare >From: Per Jensen So, since the harassers of behavioural ecology appear to have drowned their sorrows in bad whiskey, let me bring up another subject, which I touched upon in my latest mail. It seems to me that animal welfare theorists can be divided into two 'schools'. The first may be represented by Ian Duncan (if he's sober, I look forward to his reply). On a seminar in Denmark in January, he claimed that welfare depends solely on the feelings of animals. That means, that what matters to welfare is not the physical part of a disease (for example), but how an animal (or human) feels about it. Another prominent member of this school is M Dawkins, who started her impressing Brain&Behaviour paper with a very definite statement that animal welfare is about the subjective feelings of animals. The other school, represented by Don Broom, claims that welfare must be more than this, that it should include also detrimental things not directly experienced by the animals. Even if I do not think these are any opposite or impcompatible opinions, I wish to defend the Broom-school, or let us call it the objective welfare theory. There are many reasons for this. 1. Defining welfare based on the feelings of animals really puts welfare theory right into the field of cognitive ethology. In my opinion, coginitive ethology is wandering in darkness. Extremely little evidence (and I mean EVIDENCE, Georgia) has been provided that animals have any cognitive capacities at all (some experiments from learning theory, in particular learning of E1-notE2 connections are though persuasive even to me). I do think that eventually someone will come up with the data that may convince even a neo-behaviourist as me that animals really think and feel, but I think there is far to go. So, if welfare theory should be based on something we do not know about and are not able to measure, I think it is in trouble. 2. Scientific work is about finding connections, reducing complicated sets of apparent cause-effect relationships to a limited set of explanations. Introducing feelings as the very definition of welfare seems to me as blurring scientific clarity. Since I talk now about a scientific welfare theory (if you are only concerned with the ethical consequences of welfare, you may occupy yourself with feelings if you wish), this is critical. Welfare is complicated. The sound scientific way of dealing with complicated issues is to reduce and clarify. Relying on feelings appear to me the contrary. 3. I think welfare can be defined in a more objective way. We talk about biological systems (animals) designed to interact with their social and physical Umwelt. It is possible to define the way these systems work in an objective terminology, without involving feelings. We can use mathematical language, cybernetics, control theory models or whatever. Welfare is decreasing when the systems are not capable of working in the way they are designed (incidentally, understanding design has to do with behavioural ecology). The larger the deviations from normal way of working, the lesser the welfare. Look: No feelings! 4. Yes, I am aware that this means that tomatoes may have reduced welfare - so what's the problem? It does not disturb me that a good welfare theory will encompass lower animals and plants. This objection (which I have cleverly anticipated, so Ian, you don't have to raise it) only shows that scientific welfare theory is possible to have without involving too much ethics and philosophy. I do not say we don't need that. When we wish to draw conslusions for 'society use', then these things will matter. Then we may say that we think it is unacceptable that sows or hens have reduced welfare, whereas we will accept that tomatoes have, since we think that animals may very well possess feelings similar to ours, which we do not think tomatoes do. But this should not be a pre-requisite for our welfare research! So, my conclusion is a plea for a more objective, scientific, welfare theory which can fill in the gap between basic ethology and philosophy. In my opinion, relying on subjective feelings of animals is not going to be fruitful for this purpose. Best wishes, Per Jensen ============================================================================= From: IN%"IDUNCAN@APS.UoGuelph.CA" 22-APR-1994 06:57:31.43 To: IN%"Applied-Ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: The David Wood-Gush Memorial Lecture Dear All, I wish to announce that the title of my lecture at the Foulum Meeting will be : "An applied ethologist looks at the question "Why?" I am therefore somewhat reluctant to arouse myself from my present drunken stupor to tackle the questions raised by Per. But since some answer would seem to be DEMANDED at the present time, I would say this. Surely Per, it is simply a matter of semantics; I have no problem in you and Don looking at reduced biological functioning in animals and plants - that is important - but it isn't "welfare". You hit the nail on the head right at the end of your message when you say that the difference between tomatoes and the higher animals is feelings. The reason that 99% of people are concerned about reduced biological functioning in the higher animals is that it may, MAY, be accompanied by suffering. AND IT IS THE SUFFERING THAT MATTERS. The reason they may be concerned about reduced biological functioning in tomatoes is that their salad won't be the same with them! You'll have to wait until August for a more detailed argument. Yours, Ian ============================================================================= From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 22-APR-1994 08:14:25.69 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: what is animal welfare? We all need to be wary of statements that take the form: "Animal welfare is ONLY about X" or "Animal welfare DOES NOT include Y". Animal welfare is a complex issue and we should not equate animal welfare as a whole with only one of its components. We should also avoid narrow scientific definitions like those suggested by Per Jensen. Animal welfare is not primarily a scientific issue, but is a problem of the concerns of the public. Consequently any definition of animal welfare must address those concerns. If the public is concerned about subjective feelings, or about behavioural deprivation or about health, then our definition of welfare must include those. The best organizations for defining animal welfare are those that are most in tune to public opinion, and not scientists (who will inevitably define it in a way that supports their own scientific interests). I think the definition of animal welfare provided by the UK Farm Animal Welfare Council comes closest to such a comprehensive definition. I believe the view that animal welfare concerns mainly feelings results from the history of animal welfare in Europe. Research in animal welfare began with a background of attempts to pass legislation limiting what we can do to animals. Since legislation is only warranted where there is something unethical happening, then research in animal welfare was closely related to concern about the ethics of how we treat the animals that we use. Since our treatment of animals is clearly unethical when we cause them to suffer unnecessarily, then the mistaken notion arose that animal welfare is only concerened with suffering. I am 100% with Ian Duncan when he stresses the importance of emotions and suffering in animal welfare, but I part company from him when he says that animal welfare is ONLY concerned with animal suffering. My own view is that problems of health and disease are still the main concerns in animal welfare, and that behavioural problems are relatively unimportant (practically that is; scientifically behavioural problems are the most important because we know so little about them). It is a mistaken notion that health problems have been solved by modern husbandry situations. I favour the health oriented approach to animal welfare that seems to be central to people like Ingvar Ekesbo and Bo Algers. Per Jensen states that placing feelings in a definition of animal welfare puts it in the context of cognitive ethology, but that cognitive ethology is an undeveloped field. I agree totally with both these points. Per suggests that we therefore need to define welfare so as to reduce the importance given to subjectiv efeelings. In contrast, I conclude that we need instead to develop the field of cognitive ethology (instead of wasting time with behavioural ecology!- see my next message). Personally, I like tomatoes in my salad and, despite Ian Duncan, I am very much concerned when their welfare is reduced by the worms that eat them before I get a chance to. Jeff Rushen ============================================================================= From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 22-APR-1994 08:54:16.42 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: behavioural ecology I shall risk the blast of icy electronic wind howling from the bubbling stills of Guelph, New Scotland to make the following points in relation to Per Jensen's comments on behavioural ecology. I have no arguement with the belief that knowledge of the function of farm animal behaviour will help us interpret it. However, I do not believe a. that we can ever know what the function is, or b. that this knowledge should take priority of understanding the causal mechanisms underlying the behaviour. My main complaint about the speculation of function distracts us from asking causal questions. If I am right in interpreting Ian Duncans latest message, he seems to be threatening to discuss these issues in his Wood-Gush Memorial Lecture. This is particularly apt and appropriate, and Ian seems to me to be the person best qualified to deal with these issues. (can I have my bone now please- woof! woof!). In view of their importance to the future of applied ethology, I suggest that we arrange some sort of workshop after his lecture to debate the issues raised. The full text of Ians talk will also be published in the special issue of Applied Animal Behaviour Science (providing its any good). I would be happy to devote a few pages of this issue to publishing the summary of the discussions. Please let me know if you are interested. (PS Dont forget: Its not too late to register for this conference; just more expensive!). Jeff Rushen ============================================================================== From: IN%"HARRISM@sask.usask.ca" 22-APR-1994 17:28:11.88 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: cognitive capacities of non-self others I would like to take issue with Per Jensen's definitions of what animal welfare does and does not include, for a number of reasons. Firstly, it may be true that we have no "evidence" that non-human animals have any cognitive capacities, nor are capable of thinking and feeling, at all. This is equally true, for me, of human animals other than me. I have no conclusive proof that either a) I am the only sentient person I know, or b) "I" do not exist, except as a brain (or something) owned by an eccentric scientist, and that my thoughts and feelings, along with everyone else's, that I perceive from day to day, are merely wild imaginings on the part of this scientist. However, I strongly suspect that a) I do exist, and b) so do the people around me, who have thoughts and feelings also. I also strongly suspect that animals have thoughts and feelings, based on the same kind of evidence. Secondly, the fact that we have no "scientific", "objective" or any other hard evidence for thoughts/feelings/cognitive capacities is not a good excuse to exclude them, conveniently, until we suddenly are able to prove their existence. Another contributor correctly stated that to the general public, it matters not that we know absolutely something, but that they perceive it to be so. Therefore, if people perceive animals to have feelings, they have them, for all practical purposes, and we are obliged to take them into account, to a substantial extent, when attempting to assess their welfare. -- Moira Harris Dept. Animal & Poultry Science University of Saskatchewan ============================================================================= From: IN%"PAJORE@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" 23-APR-1994 22:42:52.56 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: behavioural ecology greetings all I haven't been keeping up with the network as I should, some of us are busy asking interesting questions about animal behaviour that we can't keep up with all the 15 year old quotes and rhetoric(not that were missing much). plan to respond to the criticisms of behahioural cology in due course. I just wanted to say that Jeff's main concern about distraction seems to me to be a case of classic attention defecit syndrome, too much from Ian's secret still (shh!!!) or too much of jeff's chianti (vintage tuesday). I have no problem with asking causal questions, however ignoring other aspects of animal behaviour seems narrow minded. More to come Ed Pajor ============================================================================== From: IN%"PAJORE@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" 23-APR-1994 22:54:53.78 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Behavioural Ecology Meeting to those members of the network interested in animal behaviourr the Vth international behavioural ecology cpmgress will be held at the University of Nottingham, August 14-20, 1994. Speakers for Plenary sessions include L. Partridge, J. Komdeur, A.C. Kamil and M.S. Dawkins whose is scheduled to spedak on " Back to basics: why behavioural ecology contributes less to animal welfare and conservation than it should do." Dialogue and thought, interesting concepts Ed Pajor ============================================================================== From: IN%"GJM10@PHOENIX.CAMBRIDGE.AC.UK" 24-APR-1994 08:54:49.47 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: what is welfare? Dear all - but especially Per, I would like to support Ian's view that how animal welfare is defined is a) a question of semantics, and b) a question of how animals feel. Per rightly points out that people have divided into two camps over how they use the term welfare. But he seems to imply that these are scientific differences, by calling the two views opposing "animal welfare theories". They aren't THEORIES - they are DEFINITIONS! Theories are things that can be tested - definitions are a matter of opinion! Ecologists probably have similar arguments about "what is conservation?", and psychologists about "what is 'mental health'?", where differences that arise cannot be settled by doing more science. As for the knotty issue of feelings .... Per's (and Don B's?) definition of animal welfare sidesteps this problem by looking at deviations from biological norms. Thus according to them, a Pekinese dog that can't fend for itself, a neutered cat that can't reproduce, a eutrophic pond and a bruised tomato - all have "reduced welfare". The problems with such a broad view are obvious ... 1) the definition is so far removed from colloquial uses of the term "animal welfare" that it looks quite barmy (Jeff is right that in the non- scientific worls at least there is a clear consensus about what the ter refers to) 2) the definition avoids the issue that within the set of "animals with deviations from the normal way of working", there is a subset who are particular subjects for concern (and scientific investigation) - a subset who may be expereincing mental states of suffering. People are worried about battrey hens in a way they simply aern't about bruised tomatos!!! The biology of humans and many other animals is sufficiently similar for there to be a possibililty that other animals expereince certian states as being "nice" or "nasty" just as we do (I bet even a neo-behaviouralist like Per would have qualms about kicking, stabbing or starving an animal!!). Just beause 'Other minds' are, as Moira Harris points out, inherently inaccessible does not mean that scientific data can't be used to make INFERENCES about them. As for the issue of cognition - why pick on me, Per? What did I say?! I'd dispute that there is "no evidence for cognitive capacities in animals"; animal learning studies have shown animals to have internal representations, to be able to form abstract concepts, and so on. But what exactly do you MEAN by "cognitive capacities", Per? And what relation- ship do they have with feelings? (Jeff??). There are no logical or biological reasons for thinking that smart animals can suffer more, are there??? (Marc Bekoff's got a paper coming out on this in Animal Welfare, so watch that space!) Bye for now! Georgia (Mason) ============================================================================= From: IN%"rhb11@hermes.cambridge.ac.uk" "R.H. Bradshaw" 25-APR-1994 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: introduction Dear All, I have been on the network for some time and thought it about time I introduced myself. I completed an Undergraduate degree in the University of Wales in Zoology where my interests became wrapped up in vole and puffin ecology. I then completed a Master's degree in Mammal Ecology in Cambridge. Here I looked at various questions which included an investigation of the effects of pesticides (in East Angian farmlands) on wildlife (particularly rodent populations. Due to my growing interest in Animal Welfare I moved to Oxford where I completed my thesis on social aspects of welfare in laying hens. This included work on dominance and recognition. After the completion of my thesis I returned to Cambridge and worked for a year on aspects of learning and memory in chicks. Following this I worked in Oxford addressing various issues including: Theoretical questons surrounding the calculation of social dominance, the scientific method and subjective experience in animals, the cognitive abilities of animals, the application of evolutionary theory to human and non-human primate behaviour, theoretical argument surrounding the existence of 'feelings' in animals, various other aspects of Anaiml Welfare and applied ethology. I have published varous articles relating to these issues. I am currently working with Prof Broom in the Vet School in Cambridge on the pig welfare. I think I really have one on long enough for what should be a 'brief' introduction I think. Thank you for listening; Yours, Harry Bradshaw ============================================================================= From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 25-APR-1994 08:17:59.72 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: animal welfare According to Gergia Mason: Per rightly points out that people have divided into two camps over how they use the term welfare. But he seems to imply that these are scientific differences, by calling the two views opposing "animal welfare theories". They aren't THEORIES - they are DEFINITIONS! Theories are things that can be tested - definitions are a matter of opinion! ****(end of quote) This is an interesting point, but I believe that Per and Ian are, in fact, presenting theories about animal welfare. Ian's theory is that animal welfare is only concerned with conscious suffering. These theories can be tested scientifically, unlike a definition. The way we can test them is as follows: do a survey of a large number of people who have some concern or interest about animal welfare, including farmers, vets, general public etc. and ask them what they think animal welfare is. Ian, Pers and Don B.'s theories can be tested by seeing how well they correspond with the responses given in the survey. The point of this is that "welfare" is not part of an animal but is in the eyes of the beholder. We need not concern ourselves with the animal in deciding what welfare is. Of course, we need to take measurements of the animals when we come to decide or infer what the actual level of welfare is. Gergia also states: (People) are worried about battrey hens in a way they simply aern't about bruised tomatos!!! The biology of humans and many other animals is ****(end of quote) The arguement about bruised tomatoes is not subtle and does not do justice to the arguements against the "feelings only" view of welfare. Consider the following scenario: a person has a lethal form of cancer but which is not manifest in any particular symptoms. During a routine visit the doctor detects the cancer but delays telling the patient even though she (the doctor) begins to plan a course of therapy. Later the patient is informed. When does the patients welfare begin to decrease. Ian (unless I am misinterpreting his view) would argue that this does not happen until the patient is told. However, I would suggest that the majority of vets, general public etc. would say that the welfare begins to drop as the disease spreads. I believe that decisions about welfare inevitably involve some decision about the necessity of intervention. Consequently, the patients welfare drops when the doctors diagnose the disease. A similar case holds for animals with a disease, where the symptoms have not yet developed to the point where the bother the animal. Later on she also says: There are no logical or biological reasons for thinking that smart animals can suffer more, are there??? (Marc Bekoff's got a paper coming out on this in ****(end of quote) I agree with this. I think there is a difference between cognitive and conscious. It is clear from research on humans that most of the cognitive operations we perform are done so unconsciously. There are also only theoretical reasons (as opposed to actual empirical demonstrations) why hard-wired non-cognitive reflexes are not associated with conscious feelings. Jeff Rushen ============================================================================= From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 25-APR-1994 09:04:10.37 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: behavioural ecology (reply to ED) Ed Pajor states: (quote) I haven't been keeping up with the network as I should, some of us are busy asking interesting questions about animal behaviour that we can't keep up with all the 15 year old quotes and rhetoric(not that were missing much). plan to respond to the criticisms of behahioural cology in due course. I just wanted to say that Jeff's main concern about distraction seems to me to be a case of classic attention defecit syndrome, too much from Ian's secret still (end of quote) Of course it is a case of "attention deficit" caused by the fact that there are only a limited number of researchers, with limited resources and limited time who must choose which (out of many) lines of research to follow. Peter Medawar described science as "the art of the soluble". Someone who is asking interesting, unanswerable (and useless) functional questions will be spending less time asking interesting, answerable (and useful) causal questions. He also states: (quote) (shh!!!) or too much of jeff's chianti (vintage tuesday). *****nothing wrong with this as a solvent****** I have no problem with asking causal questions, however ignoring other aspects of animal behaviour seems narrow minded. (end of quote) A challenge: can you (or anyone else interested in function of farm animal behaviour) give one example of applied ethology where interest in functional has actually led to experiments which have improved our knowledge of the causal mechanisms of behaviour, rather than just to idle speculation? Jeff Rushen ============================================================================== From: IN%"eagv49@castle.edinburgh.ac.uk" "R Young" 25-APR-1994 09:10:28.25 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Another ethologist comes out of the closet Hi Everyone, As everybody else is making their introduction to the users of the applied ethology server, I decided may be I should come out of the closet and say "hello". My name is Rob. Young, I have a background as a pure ethologist/behavioural ecologist (did my first degree in Biology with Chris Barnard and Pete MacGregor at Nottingham University, UK) having originally done research on territorial behaviour in wild birds and foraging behaviour in fish. I then moved on to doing my Ph.D. with Alistair Lawrence at SAC-Edinburgh, UK on 'Foraging motivation in the domestic pig' during the course of which I developed original operant methodology (the 'Edinburgh Foodball' amongst other things). Last year I held a one year post on looking at the feasibility of using the foodball with group-housed sows. Currently, I am a part-time lecturer in 'Animal Behaviour' at Napier University in Edinburgh, UK and I also do some lecturing at Edinburgh University to B.Sc. and M.Sc. students. I currently have research interests in the following subject areas: social behaviour of primates; stereotypies in large zoo-housed carnivores and psychologically normal humans; environmental enrichment for zoo and farm animals (including horses) and in operant conditioning methodology and technology. My present employment contracts run out in September of this year, so any so offers of jobs or suggestions of how I can keep my research career going would be gratefully received. Regards, Rob. Young ============================================================================== From: IN%"msauther@artsci.wustl.edu" "Michelle Sauther" 26-APR-1994 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: introduction Hello! I would like to formally introduce myself. My name is Michelle Sauther and I am a primatologist. I study ringtailed lemur socioecology and behavior at Beza Mahafaly Special Reserve, in Madagascar. My interests are feeding ecology in relation to inter-individual differences(e.g. sex differences, effects of dominance rank on feeding behavior etc.), mating strategies and reproduction. I am glad to be on the net! Dr. Michelle L. Sauther Anthropology Dept. Box 1114 Washington University St. Louis, MO 63110 ============================================================================= From: IN%"GJM10@PHOENIX.CAMBRIDGE.AC.UK" 26-APR-1994 10:27:10.09 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: What's an An. Welf. theory? Via: uk.ac.cambridge.phoenix; Tue, 26 Apr 1994 17:09:37 +0100 Is the statement "Animal welfare is concerned with mental suffering" an animal welfare theory? As it stands - no. It is not scientifically testable, because it doesn't generate predictions. But the statement, "Most people think that animal welfare is concerned with mental suffering" IS a theory. To test it, you survey people as Jeff has suggested - if they mostly agree with this definition (sic) of animal welfare, your theory is accepted, if they say, "Ooo no! I like to think of welfare an animal's state as regards its attempts to cope with its environment, myself!", then your theory is rejected. And I'd agree with Jeff that this would be an interesting and worthwhile thing to do. I think that terms should not be defined in such a way that they differ radically from how they are used colloquially, on the whole. (Otherwise, people flip from using them in the newly- defined way to the colloquially-defined way, and end up always making little inverted commas movements with their fingers every time they use the term! - in the way that people do with stress, or should I say "stress"). The question of whether an animal or human with a lethal cancer it is not as yet aware of has reduced welfare, is a very intersting one. Personally, I think that such an individual does NOT have a CURRENT welfare problem, because it is blissfully unaware of the problems to come. But it does have a POTENTIAL welfare problem, because soon its going to be in pain, or extremely worried, or both. And it does have a HEALTH problem, because without medical intervention it will die an untimly death. Likewise, someone swimming near a shrk they don't know about (oops - SHARK) doesn't have a welfare problem, although likely to have one in the near future .... As to what the majority of vets, the general public etc think about the "unfelt cancer" problem - I'm as sure as Jeff they'd consider it a problem, but I'm not as sure as Jeff they'd consider it a WELFARE problem ... I think we'd all better get out on the streets and do some market research! Georgia ============================================================================== From: IN%"ALund@ZI.KU.DK" "Lund, Anders {ZI}" 27-APR-1994 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" "ISAE-net" CC: Subj: the elusiveness of welfare I find it amazing that the term animal welfare can cause such a commotion and muddling of actual topic, ways to scientifically investigate it and public opinion. I would like to present an analogy: Nuclear physics is the science of what goes on inside atoms. Nobody can see what goes on inside atoms, but through a number of sofisticated scientific methods, a lot can be inferred. Nevertheless, little curles on a photographic emulsion is not, and will never be, an atom. A sociologist may find it worthwhile to ask the public what they think nuclear physics is, but I find it hard to believe that any scientist of the field would spend time on questionnaires in order to learn something about atoms. It is totally beyond my comprehension what the public opinion has to do with my work on animal welfare, exept for possibly laudate or critise the results. I find that Ian Duncan, OF COURSE, is right in saying that animal welfare is what goes on inside the animal, but this is of absolutely no interest, when it comes to design scientific work in the field. Our task is to find sound methods to learn something about what goes on inside the animals, and we can use vetrinarian medicine or any other relevant information to reach the goal of good scientific predictions, relating to welfare problems. Just because we happen to work in a field that has public interest, we should not let laymen tell us how to do our work. Why bother with education and smart experiments if "the man on the steet" knows better? Anders Lund ============================================================================== From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 27-APR-1994 08:17:52.12 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: animal welfare Anders Lund writes: (quote) I find it amazing that the term animal welfare can cause such a commotion and muddling of actual topic, ways to scientifically investigate it and public opinion. I would like to present an analogy: ***(end of quote) This simply shows that the topic is a complex one with ethical, social, legislative and philosophical aspects. It is NOT purely a scientific issue like determining the structure of atoms. The analogy is not a good one. When dealing with a complex issue, it is often better to be muddle-headed than simple-minded! He further states: (quote) It is totally beyond my comprehension what the public opinion has to do with my work on animal welfare, exept for possibly laudate or critise the results. *****(end of quote). Anders is mixing things up here. We need to distinguish between two questions. The first is "what is welfare in the abstract, or general sense?". Does good welfare mean absence of disease, absence of suffering, ability to perform normal behaviour etc. ? This question can be answered by determining public attitudes. There are two main reasons why money is spent on animal welfare research. The first is to determine whether the publics concern about intensive husbandry systems is correct. To answer this we must know what the public is concerned about! Their concern is the "definition" of animal welfare. If the public is worried that animals in intensive housing systems are exepriencing "suffering", then our general definition of welfare must include "suffering" otherwise our research is irrelevant! The other reason that money is spent on welfare research is because stress can reduce productivity and increase disease. Again, our definition of welfare must include disease or it will be irrelevent. Once we have determined what welfare is in the general or abstract sense. We must then determine what the actual level of welfare is for real animals in particular housing systems. This, I agree, is primarily a scientific matter and we would not try to answer this, second question by taking public opinion polls. He further states: (quote) I find that Ian Duncan, OF COURSE, is right in saying that animal welfare is what goes on inside the animal, but this is of absolutely no interest, when it comes to design scientific work in the field. Our task is to find sound ***(end of quote) I dont understand this. If welfare is concerned with what is going on inside the animals head, then the scientific experiments must study what is going on inside the animals head! Perhaps this is the main problem why research in animal welfare has not been particularly successful: because it is unrelated to what welfare really is!! Jeff Rushen ============================================================================ From: IN%"rhb11@hermes.cambridge.ac.uk" "R.H. Bradshaw" 27-APR-1994 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Welfare definitions "Most people think that animal welfare is concerned with mental suffering" I agree. "I like to think of welfare as an animal's state as regards its attempts to cope with its environment " Georgia concludes that this definition means that the above should be rejected. I disagree. It depends on what is meant by 'animal's state'. This could cover both physiological state and state of 'metaphysical substance' or mental suffering. I mention this because I can not grasp the meaning of welfare definitions which attempt to shy away from the notion that welfare scientists are attempting to study the subjective state of animals [and I am not convinced that this defintions is trying to do so]. "I cannot imagine a life without a mind to comprehend it" Bertrand Russel Harry ============================================================================= From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 27-APR-1994 11:18:52.73 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: animal welfare (reply to Georgia Mason) According to Georgia, (quote) Is the statement "Animal welfare is concerned with mental suffering" an animal welfare theory? As it stands - no. It is not scientifically testable, because it doesn't generate predictions. ****Yes it does. It generates the testable prediction that ****if you ask a large number of people the quastion " ****What is animal welfare concerned about?" they will answer ****"Mental suffering". (quote continues) But the statement, "Most people think that animal welfare is concerned with mental suffering" IS a theory. To test it, you survey people as Jeff has suggested - if they mostly agree with this definition (sic) of animal welfare, your theory is accepted, if they say, "Ooo no! I like to think of welfare an animal's state as regards its attempts to cope with its environment, myself!", then your theory is rejected. (end of quote) The difference between Georgia and myself is that she thinks there are two things: first, animal welfare, and secondly peoples opinions as to what animal welfare is. Presumably, she would accept the possibility that the public could be wrong about animal welfare. That is, scientists could do some experiments and then report to the public "No, you are wrong. University tests have proven that animal welfare is NOT concerned with mental suffering." However, I think that "animal welfare" and "what the public thinks animal welfare is" are the same thing. That is the particular concerns that the public has define what animal welfare is. I think it would be meaningless for scientists to tell the public that they are "wrong". To repeat: if the public think that animal welfare is concerned with mental suffering, then it is. If they dont, then it isnt. If the public changes its mind about what animal welfare is then animal welfare also changes. Anders Lund made the analogy with research in nuclear physics. But I believe that research into animal welfare is more analogous to research into something like "disturbances from living near an airport". If you were to do research on such a topic, it would not make sense to try to define "disturbance" in a scientific vaccuum (as Per Jensen tries to do for welfare), as, for example, noise levels above a certain number of decibels. Instead, you would need to go to people who live near airports and ask them what it is about airports that bothers them. They may not mention noise levels at all, but instead mention only planes taking off at night. If they did this, you could not accuse them of being "wrong". The same is for animal welfare. Jeff Rushen ============================================================================== From: IN%"Linda.Keeling@hhyg.slu.se" 27-APR-1994 12:13:38.48 To: IN%"Applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: public opinion Can I add my opinion to the discussion about the importance of public opinion in animal welfare - started in a mail from Jeff Rushen but criticised in a mail from Anders Lund. Jeff suggested that it would be interesting to "do a survey of a large number of people......and ask them what they think animal welfare is" and Anders Lund said "Why bother with smart experiments if the man on the street knows best". I'm sorry to be diplomatic here (everybody on this net seems to love to disagree), but I think it is time to remind people that there are two levels in the animal welfare debate :- 1) The level that is concerned with each animal and its welfare. It is at this level that we can discuss whether it is the extent to which an animal copes with its environment or how an animal feels about its environment that is important. 2) The level that is concerned with how we in society should keep and treat animals. This second level is going to be a compromise between what is important to the animal and what is important to the consumer, the farmer and even the politician. Can we have different words for these two levels so every body knows at what level everybody else is talking. I am not sure whether the words ANIMAL WELFARE should refer to the 'big society' level or the 'individual animal' level, although I personally prefer ANIMAL WELFARE to refer to the welfare of the 'individual animal'. So, while I think it would be interesting to find out public opinion, as Jeff suggested, I think that definitions of animal welfare (or should I say theories :-) should come from scientists working in the area. The public would be just too likely to confuse the two levels of animal welfare to come up with a good theory (or is it definition:-). Linda Keeling Skara, Sweden. ============================================================================== From: IN%"bjarne.braastad@nlh10.nlh.no" 28-APR-1994 02:21:22.28 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: RE: public opinion In Message Wed, 27 Apr 1994 12:11:09 -0600 (CST), Linda.Keeling@hhyg.slu.se (Linda Keeling) writes: > > Can I add my opinion to the discussion about the >importance of public opinion in animal welfare - started in a mail >from Jeff Rushen but criticised in a mail from Anders Lund. > > Jeff suggested that it would be interesting to "do a survey >of a large number of people......and ask them what they think >animal welfare is" and Anders Lund said "Why bother with smart >experiments if the man on the street knows best". > > I'm sorry to be diplomatic here (everybody on this net >seems to love to disagree), but I think it is time to remind people >that there are two levels in the animal welfare debate :- > >1) The level that is concerned with each animal and its welfare. It >is at this level that we can discuss whether it is the extent to which >an animal copes with its environment or how an animal feels about >its environment that is important. >2) The level that is concerned with how we in society should keep >and treat animals. This second level is going to be a compromise >between what is important to the animal and what is important to >the consumer, the farmer and even the politician. > > Can we have different words for these two levels so every >body knows at what level everybody else is talking. I am not sure >whether the words ANIMAL WELFARE should refer to the 'big society' >level or the 'individual animal' level, although I personally prefer >ANIMAL WELFARE to refer to the welfare of the 'individual animal'. > > So, while I think it would be interesting to find out >public opinion, as Jeff suggested, I think that definitions of >animal welfare (or should I say theories :-) should come from >scientists working in the area. The public would be just too likely >to confuse the two levels of animal welfare to come up with a good >theory (or is it definition:-). > > >Linda Keeling >Skara, Sweden. I agree with Linda's view. In fact I had planned to make a similar comment myself. I suggest (as Linda) that 'Animal Welfare' is used for the 'individual level', focusing on subjects in line with Don Broom's definition. The 'public opinion' aspect could perhaps be called 'Animal Ethics'. It is important to distinguish between welfare and ethics. Take fur animals as an example. A mink in a cage may or may not have a good welfare. But even if the welfare was 'good' some people take the view that mink should in no case be kept on farms, since it is only used for clothes, not food. I personally do not agree with this view, but the latter view is more a matter of ethics than welfare. I also remind people that e.g. Don Broom distinguishes between 'animal welfare' and 'animal well-being'. He uses the latter term in line with Ian Duncan's concept of animal welfare. "Well-being refers to what the animal feels about its state", he states in the book "Farm animal behaviour and welfare, 3rd Ed." (Fraser & Broom 1990). Bjarne Braastad Dept. Animal Science, Agricultural University of Norway, Aas, Norway ============================================================================== From: IN%"GJM10@PHOENIX.CAMBRIDGE.AC.UK" 28-APR-1994 05:10:11.22 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: yet more welfare rants ... Just for the record - Jeff, I hate to disappoint you but I don't really think we disgree! We differ over what a definition is, compared to a theory; and in making the distinction I made earlier I was just trying to "unpack" your statement that 'animal welfare = feelings' is a theory. When you say, 'animal welfare = feelings' (or whatever), you mean that 'animal welfare is universaly regarded as being about feelings' ... Fair enough! But I would NOT say, to paraphrase your last message, that university tests could disprove that animal welfare is concerned with mental suffering. How on earth could they? The issue of what animal welfare is ain't open to proof or disproof by scientists, because you can't prove a definition. That's enough pedantry (for now...) Georgia ============================================================================== From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 28-APR-1994 07:25:03.18 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: animal welfare/public opinion I agree with Linda Keeling and Bjarne Braastad that there are different aspects to animal welfare, and some aspects involve mainly scientific issues while others involve public opinion or "ethical" issues. I also agree that much apparent disagreement comes because people are talking about different aspects. However, I believe there are more than 2 aspects, as Linda suggests. I would suggest a four would be a more appropriate number. The first aspect is the general definition of animal welfare, in the abstract. For example, does good welfare require the ability to express all natural behaviours? Does it only require good health, or absence of mental suffering? This is the level we have been arguing about. I maintain that this is primarily a matter of public "opinion", with some technical input from philosophers and relatively little input from scientists (except when, like Ian Dunca, they turn into philosophers). Once some consensus has been reached on this general dfinition, then we need determine the conditions under which each species must live in order to have good welfare. That is, if our definition requires that animals need express natural behaviour, then we need to know for each species what the natural behaviour is. This is primarily a scientific issue, and most of the more fundamental research done by us (in motivation falls in this area). However, research here can only be done once we have some consensus at the first step. That is why it is necessary to know public opinion BEFORE doing the research. (This is probably where I differ from Linda.) The thrid step is to go out and examine animals in different housing systems to determine how closely they conform to these requirements. Again, this more applied step is primarily a scientific matter. Finally, if we find a discrepancy between how animals should be housed (based on our defintion of welfare) and how they are housed then we need to decide whether or not to do anything about it. This is the "ethical" step, and is not a scientific issue. I differ from Linda and Bjarne because I think that public opinion is not only involved in the ethical decsions that have to be made (step 4), but also because public opinion is also involved in defining welfare in the general sense (step 1). Public opinion is therefore involved in measuring welfare at the individual level because we need a general defintion before we can measure anything. (Personally I dont believe we can measure welfare, but that is a different issue). (thank you for the arguements everybody!) Jeff Rushen ============================================================================== From: IN%"MAPPLEBY@srv0.bio.edinburgh.ac.uk" "Mike Appleby" 28-APR-1994 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: timescale of welfare assessment Dear All So we have welfare as (a) physical (Broom), (b) mental (Duncan), (c) public opinion (Rushen). One factor which I think has been largely neglected - because unrecognised - in these discussions is the time scale over which welfare is assessed. I suspect that most consideration is actually very short-term: how does the animal feel at a particular moment? What is the animal's fitness, assessed on the basis of what we know today? This gives problems with all three of the above 'definitions' and in fact if we take a longer-term view the distinctions between them begin to blur. a) The issue most often raised in relation to a 'physical' definition of welfare is that of a disease or tumour which doesn't yet affect the animal: is its welfare reduced NOW? That 'now' seems to me to be a wrong formulation of the question. Clearly if the tumour never comes to affect the animal physically or mentally - if it turns out to be benign - then its welfare is not reduced. If it does, then its welfare is reduced IN THE LONG TERM. b) A common question about feelings is also short term: isn't the welfare of the heroin addict adequate while she is high? IF sows showing sterotypies were high on opioids (and I stress IF), would they be OK while stereotyping? These questions are not worth answering, because we have to consider the addict over 24 hours, not over 2. And I guess that if we integrate over long periods, mental states are more likely to correlate with physical ones. c) Timescale is also a problem with public opinion. Jeff seems to think of it as something fixed and amorphous; in fact it changes and can be influenced. 'Public opinion' must always come down to individual people (I've heard it said that the phrase 'Research on public opinion shows that ... ' means 'I've asked around the office'). It doesn't hold water to say that if the public says hens should be allowed to fly then that is by definition necessary for hen welfare, because what the 'public' says depends on which individuals were polled and which newspaper they read that morning, or which facts they were given in the preamble to the questionnaire. Integrating over a longer timescale is perhaps even more difficult here than for (a) and (b) because of our reliance on 'snapshot' polls, but we should certainly try to do so, and I haven't given up hope that we can bring 'public' and scientific assessments of welfare closer together. In fact in many ways I think that we have to consider the lifetime of the animal rather than a shorter timescale, because so many aspects of its physical state and perceptions are affected by experience. So how about (d) the holistic view? Mike Appleby ============================================================================= From: IN%"ATAYLOR@APS.UoGuelph.CA" "Allison Taylor" 28-APR-1994 11:57:28.88 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Can there be "Bad Welfare"? Greetings, all. I have been lurking for a while, and am very interested in the current thread on welfare definition .... I am a doctoral student at the University of Guelph, working under that advisorship of Dr. Frank Hurnik. My thesis topic is on developing a more objective, integrative methodology for assessing quality of life, using the laying hen as a model. I have been saving the recent postings about welfare definition, and hope to find the time in the not-too-distant future to go through them in some detail, and perhaps offer some comments of my own. However, I wanted to make a point and raise a question with regard to terminology .. (oh no!!). I have logical difficulty conceiving of a state of "bad welfare" or "poor well-being". To my mind, "welfare" and "well-being" refer to *positive* states of being, ie. one end of the scale. If we want to talk about the scale itself, I propose (and have used) the term "Quality of Life". This term is neutral and descriptive. The question that I am rapidly led to, however, is whether welfare or well-being (as I use them above) encompasses a range of Qualities of Life, or is a single state. To illustrate, imagine a typical number line, with a zero at the mid point. The traditional view would have "good welfare" to the right of the zero point, and "bad welfare" to its left. I would argue that we should call the whole line the Quality of Life scale. That done, we would then label all points to the left of zero as degrees of Poor QofL, and those to the right as Good QofL. But my question is this: Can we justifiably call *all* points to the right of zero welfare or well-being? Intuitively (to me, at least), true welfare or well-being represents an optimal or ideal state. Therefore, can we really talk about *degrees* of welfare (even after we've weeded out what was previously called "poor welfare")? I guess what I'm getting at is that I tend to see quality of life as somewhat of a dichotomy : either an organism has it or it doesn't. It may be reasonable to consider degrees of Not Having It, but I am not sure that we can realistically talk about degrees of Having It. I am still very much in the rumination stage on this line of thought, and would appreciate any feedback. Allison Allison Taylor Dept. of Animal and Poultry Science ataylor@aps.uoguelph.ca University of Guelph Graduate Student Ontario CANADA N1G 2W1 ====================================================================== Sometimes he thought __/----------------_ _ which?" -- and sadly to himself, _- \ \ sometimes he "Why?" and sometimes - ||| didn't quite he thought "Where- //: | / || know what he fore?" and some- //V:V \ \ ) ___ | || *was* thinking times he thought, || : | | |----- | | | \\ about. "Inasmuch as /_/|:__-\__\__) (__(___/ MM (A.A. Milne) ====================================================================== From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 28-APR-1994 13:58:26.64 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: animal welfare: time scales and public opinion Mike Appleby makes some very good points, and I agree with a lot of what he says (especially about the need to have a holistic view of welfare). However, on two aspects, I disagree. First, the idea that we need to integrate 'feelings' over a long time scale brings up my main concern over the idea that animal welfare is mainly about mental states. I think of a mental state as something short-lasting. That is, if I stub my toe for a while I am in pain, but then something else happens and my mental state changes. Humans do have some ability to integrate subjective feelings over a longer time scale. For example, we can say that `Today, I had a good/bad day'. We may even be able to integrate over quite large time scales and say, for example, `I like living in Canada'. However, I am not sure how accurate we really are in making this integration. I suspect that the recent events are given a higher rating (`I like living in Canada because today is warm and sunny!'). I really dont know if other animals have the ability to integrate their mental experiences over longer time scales. Most measures of subjective experiences e.g. choice tests and aversion learning really only measure short lasting mental states. If you ask a hen `Do you like living in a battery cage?` her answer will depend on when you ask her. If you ask her when she is eating, she will probably answer `Yes!'. If you ask when she is trying to dustbathe, she will probably say `No!'. I guess this is equivalent to saying that animals may be able to judge their welfare over the short term, but not over the long term. The other quibble I have is with the nature of `public opinion'. I agree that public opinion can be fickle in the sense that if you stop people in the street and ask `What should we do about Bosnia?` you probably wont get a profound answer. But what if you ask a question like `In order to be happy, should people have the right to change jobs?`. Answers to this question would be more stable (I suspect) because they deal more with the fundamental values of our society. Questions about animal welfare are also dealing with our societal values. Mike`s example: a question like `Is a chicken that cannot fly suffering?` is a factual question and you need to ask scientists not the public. A question like `Does good welfare require that animals be able to avoid suffering?` is a value question. For an answer you ask the public, not scientists. Furthermore, if the `public' consists, not of a random selection of people, but of members of animal welfare groups, farmers veterinarians, philosophers etc (i.e. people with an INTEREST in animal welfare) then the answers would be more valuable. Jeff Rushen ============================================================================= From: IN%"eagv49@castle.edinburgh.ac.uk" "R Young" 29-APR-1994 09:30:28.08 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Electronic journals and computer servers Dear All, A better example of an electronic journal is 'Laboratory Primate Newsletter' which is available from the 'Primate Information Net' (PIN) a computer server based at the University of Madison-Wisconsin. I not so sure an electronic journal is the way to, but I think that a computer server for applied ethologists like PIN would be useful. Currently, PIN not only emails out to subscribers Laboratory Primate Newsletter, but also has details on animal welfare regulations for primates, a calendar of primate events, lists of resources (bibliogaphies, software, etc.), lists of ethograms, lists of endangered species, etc. I think this would be a much better way to go, than just having an electronic journal. Furthermore it would cut down on the announcements of conferences email and the like, that is currently being sent to everyone on the applied-ethology NET. Anyway for anyone who is interested in what a computer server can do for you, then check out PIN. Regards, Rob. J. Young ============================================================================ From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 29-APR-1994 10:05:58.07 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: electronic journals Dear Everyone, Rob Young gave the good example of Laboratory Primate Newsletter for an electronic journal. You can subscribe to this by sending the message: subscribe LPN-L your name to LISTSERV@BROWNVM.BITNET or LISTSERV@BROWNVM.BROWN.EDU What I thought interesting about the example that I sent out was that it did not automatically send out the full articles but only abstracts, and indicated how one could then access the full articles. There is an email list devoted to dealing with the technical side of email publishing called VPIEJ-L, subscribed via LISTSERV@VTVM1.CC.VT.EDU There is also a list that publishes articles dealing with the pros and cons of electronic publishing. It is PACS-P and can be subscribed to via LISTSERV@UHUPVM1.UH.EDU Jeff Rushen ============================================================================== From: IN%"AG3260000@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "LENNOXVILLE" 29-APR-1994 10:39:21.41 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: animal welfare workshop Forwarded message from AR-ALERT> **************************************************************** From: OTTGW::IN%"ar-alerts@ny.neavs.com" 28-APR-1994 22:26:49.67 To: IN%"ar-alerts@ny.neavs.com" "Multiple recipients of list" CC: Subj: NIH Guide - National Animal Welfare Eduction Workshop NATIONAL ANIMAL WELFARE EDUCATION WORKSHOP NIH GUIDE, Volume 23, Number 16, April 29, 1994 P.T. 42; K.W. 0201011, 1014003 National Institutes of Health The National Institutes of Health, Office for Protection from Research Risks is continuing to sponsor workshops on implementing the Public Health Service Policy on Humane Care and Use of Laboratory Animals. Each of the workshops scheduled for Fiscal Year 1994 will focus on a specific theme. The workshops are open to institutional administrators, members of Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees, laboratory animal veterinarians, investigators and other institutional staff who have responsibility for high-quality management of sound institutional animal care and use programs. Ample opportunities will be provided to exchange ideas and interests through question and answer sessions and informal discussions. MIDWEST REGION DATES: MAY 5-6, 1994 TOPIC: Training and Education: Institutional Improvement - Crisis Prevention LOCATION Stewart Center and Memorial Union, Campus of Purdue University SPONSOR Purdue University REGISTRATION Ms. Lisa D. Snider, Administrative Assistant Laboratory Animal Program Purdue University 1071 South Campus Courts-D West Lafayette, IN 47907-1071 Telephone: (317) 494-7206 FAX: (317) 494-0793 FEE: $150.00 - Regular; $50.00 - Graduate Students/Post-Docs DESCRIPTION: The general theme will focus on continuing education and training as mandated by the National Institutes of Health and USDA. The format will include panel discussions and concurrent breakout sessions. The group discussions will address occupational health; analgesia/pain/surgery; euthanasia; and tailoring the CET programs to specific audiences. NORTHWEST REGION DATES: AUGUST 4-5, 1994 TOPIC: Sharing Animal Welfare Responsibilities Between Affiliated Institutions LOCATION Portland Marriott Hotel, Portland, OR SPONSOR Department of Veterans Affairs REGISTRATION Ms. Margaret Doherty Veterans Affairs Medical Center P.O. Box 1034 Portland, OR 92707-1034 Telephone: (503) 220-8262 Ext. 7610 FAX: (503) 273-5351 FEE: $150 - Regular; $100 - Students and Technicians DESCRIPTION: The workshop will explore the relationships among academia, government, and industry as they pertain to the care and use of laboratory animals and animal research facilities and programs. The speakers will focus on issues such as sorting out collaborations, assuming responsibility; VA vs Academia; cost and benefits of industrial contracts and agreements; building a shared institutional animal care and use committee; and the regulatory agencies' perspective and oversight. SOUTHEASTERN REGION DATES: September 29-30, 1994 TOPIC: Use of Animals in Research and Alternatives LOCATION Monteleone Hotel, New Orleans, LA SPONSORS Louisiana State University Medical Center Xavier University of Louisiana REGISTRATION Ms. Lois Herbez, Administrative Secretary Louisiana State University Medical Center 1542 Tulane Avenue New Orleans, LA 70112 Telephone: (504) 568-4198 FAX: (504) 568-4843 FEE: $150 DESCRIPTION: The theme of the workshop will address various aspects of the use of animals in research and the role of animals and alternatives in research and education. The workshop will address such issues as (1) Adequacy of Computer Searches; (2) NIH, USDA, FDA Alternatives Initiative; (3) Occupational Health - Implementation, Update and Biosafety Concerns; (4) Roles of Animals and Alternatives in Education. INQUIRIES For further information concerning these workshops and future NIH Animal Welfare Education Workshops, contact: Ms. Roberta Sonneborn Office for Protection from Research Risks National Institutes of Health Building 31, Room 5B63 Bethesda, MD 20892 Telephone: (301) 496-7163 FAX: (301) 402-2803 ============================================================================= From: IN%"AG150AB@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" 29-APR-1994 11:23:21.68 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: behavioural ecology Dear Network, We have read the recent diatribes against the field of behavioural ecology with a combination of pity and disgust. The insecurities of these authors (reflected, perhaps, in the current orgy of self-doubt regarding what it is that they actually study), will hardly be mitigated by criticisms of approaches that they have made little attempt to understand. We have nothing against the approaches they espouse, but simply argue that these are not necessarily better or worse than those of behavioural ecology. It is difficult to anticipate which approaches will lead to the most important advances in applied ethology, and it is possible that descriptions of physiological or neurological mechanisms will provide the major innovations and direction to the field. Still, it would seem unwise to rule out other approaches at this point. Since even Jeff Rushen is unable to predict the future and tell us which approaches will be most profitable, we might be better off to follow our hearts and use the approaches that we find most interesting. Our own reason for finding the approach of behavioural ecology useful, is that it can provide a theoretical context for understanding behaviour. The physiological or neurological bases for a behaviour become much more interesting, if we understand why animals exhibit the behaviour in the first place. Behavioural ecology can, we believe, offer a great deal to the field of applied animal behaviour. It is an intellectually interesting, vibrant and successful discipline, that has only just begun to become incorporated into the field of domestic animal behaviour (see, for example, papers by Fraser, Jensen, and Algers). We can provide several examples from our own current work in Ottawa of how this approach can be useful in the study of applied ethology. In one study we are using behavioural ecology theory on how animals trade off conflicting sources of mortality or fitness, to predict which piglets are at the greatest risk of crushing by sows. In another, we are using predictions from behavioural ecology theory on parent- offspring conflict, to find better ways to house farrowing sows and to wean piglets. In a third study, we are using behavioural ecology signalling theory to predict situations in which vocalizations (and other behaviours) will provide handlers with reliable information about the animals condition. The criticisms against behavioural ecology may have been in reaction to the field's traditional emphasis on function as opposed to mechanism. This is now changing, as evident from a recent meeting on behavioural mechanisms in evolutionary perspective held in Madrid in October, 1992 (a summary of this meeting was published in Trends in Ecology and Evolution, vol.8 No. 3, March 1993). Many modern behavioural ecologists now see the study of function and mechanism going on hand in hand. For example, the problem of how learning and perceptual constraints can influence sexual selection is now receiving a great deal of interest. To react to their emphasis on function by placing our emphasis on mechanism, would seem juvenile to the point of being pathetic. Rather, we should learn from the history of behavioural ecology, and remain open to interesting work using different approaches. Does this mean that everyone should jump on a behavioural ecology bandwagon - of course not. Individuals should ask the questions that they find interesting. The fact that some cannot successfully incorporate ideas from behavioural ecology into their own work may reflect their ignorance of the field, or perhaps just their personal preferences. For example, we have made no attempt use a neuro-anatomical approach in our studies because we are largely ignorant of the techniques and because we personally find the behavioural ecology approach more interesting, but hopefully not because of any blinkered conviction that ours is the true path from which all others simply stray. Ed Pajor and Dan Weary Animal Behaviour Team Central Experimental Farm Ottawa, Canada ============================================================================ From: IN%"AG150AB@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" 29-APR-1994 11:23:37.87 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: welfare Dear Network, Yes, it's us again. Now that we've dispensed with the rather weak criticisms against behavioural ecology, we thought we'd stick the proverbial oar into the debate on 'what is welfare and how do we study it'. As there have been a lot of clever things said about this subject by a lot of clever people, our contribution can only be a minor one. We have three points. The first relates to our other letter, and is that we must not be too ready to exclude approaches or ideas from our field of study. Animal Welfare may be about physical states or about feelings, and there may be many different ways to describe and study these things. It would seem to be a mistake to begin by blinkering our world. The proviso is of course that as scientist the phenomena we study must, at some level, be observable. This is no way rules out the study of mental states, it simply forces us to be creative. Our second point relates to the horribly anthrocentric view that an animal's welfare can only be defined on the basis of what humans think of the animals state. We argue that a better touchstone is the animal's view of its own state! As trained and experienced animal behaviourists we might be able to have some insight into the animal's view, and should be able to design clever experiments to get at exactly this. Our subjective opinion of an animal's welfare is of little interest or relevance - and even less so are the ignorant ramblings of the 'man on the street'. Finally, we offer an alternative analogy to that of nuclear physics. How about the field of environmental studies? Here is an issue that is of great public concern - money is pouring into 'helping the environment'. The public, as bankrollers, have a right to specify the issues - say, for example, biodiversity. The scientists funded as environmental biologists will study this problem, if they are funded to do so, but how they do this is a scientific issue and not one of public opinion. Similarly, the public has agreed to fund our work on animal welfare, but they cannot really tell us how to do it - if they knew how, they wouldn't have to pay us the big bucks (?). Dan Weary & Ed Pajor Animal Behaviour Team Central Experimental Farm Ottawa, Canada =============================================================================== From: IN%"ESA017@ESAVAX.EDINBURGH.AC.UK" "MIKE MENDL" 29-APR-1994 13:27:42.76 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" "APPLIED-ETHOLOGY" CC: Subj: behavioural ecology Dear All, I, like Allison Taylor, have been "lurking" and trying desperately to keep up with the prolific network exchanges. The debate about the relevance of behavioural ecology to applied ethology is an interesting one, and I would like to add my support to the views just (5 minutes ago) beamed across by Ed Pajor and Dan Weary. The attempts by various networkers to draw such rigid distinctions between functional and causal approaches to studying behaviour and to plump for one or other as the only way forward seem misguided and divisive. By dismissing behavioural ecological theories and methods as largely irrelevant to applied ethology, we are, in my opinion, throwing away an important source of ideas and approaches for our research. Sure, post-hoc functional explanations for observed phenomena may often result in little more than hot air, but this does not mean that thinking about problems from a functional perspective is a bad thing. I think that it can even help to direct research into mechanisms of behavioural control and organisation in a fruitful way. An understanding of the differences in the mechanisms of filial and sexual imprinting was facilitated by first thinking about these processes from a functional viewpoint (Bateson, in Primate Ontogeny Cognition and Social Behaviour (Eds, Else & Lee, CUP). I think that Jeff Rushen's own interesting work on social encounters between pigs also benefitted from his attempts to ask "functional" questions about assessment during fights (I'm preparing to be crucified Jeff!). What information do pigs get from fights with others? How do they sue this information in assessing their relative fighting ability, and how does this affect their subseqent fighting behaviour? Ed, Dan and Per provide other examples. If we dismiss behavioural ecology out of hand, the questions we ask and the way in which we think about problems in applied ethology will be the poorer for it. The whole debate about behavioural ecology raises another more general question which has been alluded to by Carol Petherick in her recent ISAE newsletter. Is there a genuine schism between those interested in "pure" and "applied" ethology? If so, why is it? My impression is that many "pure" ethologists (behavioural ecologists included) look down their noses at applied ethology. Is this because they see it as largely atheoretical subject which concerns itself with "fire-fighting" (problem solving) science? Should we attempt to disple this image by advertising our interests in motivational theory and perhaps bringing on board other theoretical approaches, and developing new areas of theoretical work? Or should we counter that at least our science is "useful", applicable science? The "pure" vs "applied" dichotomy is a value- laden and divisive one. We should attempt to lay it to rest by showing that "applied" does not also mean "dull", "atheoretical" or "bad" as some might have us believe. There. Another can of worms. Mike Mendl (Edinburgh) ============================================================================== From: IN%"SLINE@PHS.BGSM.WFU.EDU" 29-APR-1994 14:09:53.41 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: NIH Grants in Emotion NOT for Yanks only -- Just a minor clarification in regard to the recent post on NIH grants for basic research in emotion. While it is true the FIRST awards (also known as R29 grants) are limited to U.S. institutions, the program announcement also notes funds will be available for research project grants (R01) and small grants (R03). These latter two categories are NOT limited to U.S. institutions only. Although I don't have the figures, I suspect most R01s and R03s do go to U.S. labs, but then they probably apply more often as well. Scott Line Dept. of Comparative Medicine Bowman Gray School of Medicine sline@phs.bgsm.wfu.edu