Subject: Re: Need info on releasers From: Cecilia Lambert Date: Sun, 16 Aug 2009 15:55:58 -0700 (PDT) To: "John R. Lane" CC: applied-ethology@usask.ca John The book by Paul Chance is $154. Way out of my price range. Anyone have a copy to sell at a reduced price? CeAnn "He who does not punish evil, commands it to be done." Leonardo da Vinci CeAnn Lambert Indiana Coyote Rescue Center www.coyoterescue.org Please visit our gift shop @ www.cafepress.com/coyoterescue --- On Sat, 8/15/09, John R. Lane wrote: From: John R. Lane Subject: Re: Need info on releasers To: "Jay R. Feierman" , applied-ethology@usask.ca Date: Saturday, August 15, 2009, 6:42 PM Hi CeAnn and Jay, Another very simply put reference to read would be "Learning and Behavior" 2009 sixth edition by Paul Chance. Start from page 12 where it begins discussing Modal Action Patterns and continue to page 16 at the end of the discussion on releasers. It also references a number of later works that help explain this overall concept and relationship as well as the Tinbergin work. It also make the same distinction that Jay makes in that there maybe very few if any true modal action patterns in humans. The role of genetics in human behavior is seen in general behavior traits rather than Modal Action Patterns. John L. Find local businesses and services in your area with Yahoo!7 Local. Get started. Subject: Re: Need info on releasers From: "John R. Lane" Date: Sun, 16 Aug 2009 21:52:33 -0700 (PDT) To: Cecilia Lambert CC: applied-ethology@usask.ca Hi CeAnn, I am sure your local Uni library will have a copy available for loan or reference. Try through your local public library for an interloan request. Although Paul altered a lot in the 2009 edition it is still possible that earlier editions than 6 may also have the same info. There are many of these available second hand through amazon or similar. Failing this send me a private and I'll see what I can do to make the relevant material available to you temporarily. Jay firstly my apologies for misreading your post. I can see on careful reading I had thrown my own interpretation in which most definitely wasn't in your post. But given this I can see we can have an interesting converstaion on the issue of whether humans show true MAPs in the area of courtship and maternal instinct and other areas that you suggest or whether the complete variability between cultures and even among individuals in the same culture of the expression of these rule them out as true MAPs. However as this is more a list for ethology as it relates to other species perhaps we should shift this to private. John L. From: Cecilia Lambert To: John R. Lane Cc: applied-ethology@usask.ca Sent: Monday, 17 August, 2009 10:55:58 AM Subject: Re: Need info on releasers John The book by Paul Chance is $154. Way out of my price range. Anyone have a copy to sell at a reduced price? CeAnn "He who does not punish evil, commands it to be done." Leonardo da Vinci CeAnn Lambert Indiana Coyote Rescue Center www.coyoterescue.org Please visit our gift shop @ www.cafepress.com/coyoterescue --- On Sat, 8/15/09, John R. Lane wrote: From: John R. Lane Subject: Re: Need info on releasers To: "Jay R. Feierman" , applied-ethology@usask.ca Date: Saturday, August 15, 2009, 6:42 PM Hi CeAnn and Jay, Another very simply put reference to read would be "Learning and Behavior" 2009 sixth edition by Paul Chance. Start from page 12 where it begins discussing Modal Action Patterns and continue to page 16 at the end of the discussion on releasers. It also references a number of later works that help explain this overall concept and relationship as well as the Tinbergin work. It also make the same distinction that Jay makes in that there maybe very few if any true modal action patterns in humans. The role of genetics in human behavior is seen in general behavior traits rather than Modal Action Patterns. John L. Find local businesses and services in your area with Yahoo!7 Local. Get started. Find local businesses and services in your area with Yahoo!7 Local. Get started. Subject: Re: Need info on releasers From: "Jay R. Feierman" Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2009 08:59:15 -0600 To: applied-ethology@usask.ca John R. Lane: Jay firstly my apologies for misreading your post. I can see on careful reading I had thrown my own interpretation in which most definitely wasn't in your post. But given this I can see we can have an interesting conversation on the issue of whether humans show true MAPs in the area of courtship and maternal instinct and other areas that you suggest or whether the complete variability between cultures and even among individuals in the same culture of the expression of these rule them out as true MAPs. Jay R. Feierman: That's a good question. First, to give you some background, I've been in 44 countries and over 100 small islands around the world, most observing human behavior. So I have a good appreciation for what you are asking. The best way to answer your question is to divide behavior (~ the independent movement of an individual) into two more homogenous categories. Once I do that, my answer to your question will make more sense. I'll put three references to my writing at the end of this posting. These writings contain the bases and more fully developed arguments for what I'm saying. If anyone wants a copy of the first reference, send me a private e-mail to jfeierman[at]comcast.net and ask for the Darwinian Neuropsychiatry article. I'll provide links to the other material, which are in books. Type I Behavior: Definable by form and (proximate use) function in a natural environment and species-universal in form. Type II Behavior: Describable by form and definable by (proximate use) function in a natural environment and not species-universal in form. All vertebrates show Type I Behavior. This term is synonymous with the coordinated motor pattern (aka modal action pattern or fixed action pattern) of classical ethology. Some primates (including humans), some birds, and some sea mammals have been shown to have Type II Behavior, although it is possible that it exists in other taxa and has not yet been described. The execution instructions for Type I Behaviors are transmitted across generation by DNA. The display rules for Type I Behavior, as well as the execution instructions for all Type II Behaviors are transmitted across generations by social learning. In the human species in which social learning is so highly developed, often with a Type I Behavior, the general blueprints of the behavior are passed across generations by DNA; the particulars of the general blueprint are acquired by social learning. The best example of this is the "make-oneself-lower-or-smaller-or-more-vulnerable (LSV) behavior" that is seen in all human societies in the non-vocal aspects of petitioning prayer. Although LSV behavior is seen in all societies in the non-vocal part of petitioning prayer, each society "prays" somewhat differently. Type I Behavior is only modifiable in timing, orientation, intensity, and (proximate use) function by learning. All human societies have "display rules" for when, where, with whom, to what degree, and for what (proximate use) function Type I Behaviors are executed. Type II Behaviors are also modified in timing, orientation, intensity, and (proximate use) function by learning. However, they can also be modified in form by learning in some primates (including humans), some sea mammals, and some bird taxa. Given the above, the variation in Type I behaviors seen across different societies are variations in timing, orientation, intensity and (proximate use) function. In addition, all societies have display rules that influence how Type I Behaviors are expressed, that includes how LSV behavior is expressed during petitioning prayer across societies. In terms of courtship behavior in humans (and all vertebrates), this is done with a series of Type I Behaviors. There is consistency in form across society has its own display rules about where, when, and to what degree these behaviors are exhibited. To see some examples of human female courtship behavior, that I collected over a 10 year period from Cable Television, mostly from Latin America, see this link http://www.rdos.net/flv/ . These behaviors are seen in all human societies with very minor variations depending for example on the type of clothing worn (or not worn), the length of human female hair, etc. John R. Lane: However as this is more a list for ethology as it relates to other species perhaps we should shift this to private. Jay R. Feierman: I am a strong believer in Konrad Lorenz's dictum that there is only one ethology. Each vertebrate species is unique but can be understood by the same ethological principles. To join the Yahoo human ethology group, which is very active with 275 members and between 500 - 1000 posts (on all species) per month, go to http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/human-ethology/ ________________________ REFERENCES 1. Feierman, J.R. (2006). The Ethology of Psychiatric Populations II: Darwinian Neuropsychiatry. Clinical Neuropsychiatry 3(2):87 - 109. [Request a PDF if interested from jfeierman[at]comcast.net. This publication is the origin of the Type I and Type II Behavior, although those terms are not used in this article.] 2. Feierman, J.R. Ed. (2009). The Biology of Religious Behavior: The Evolutionary Origins of Faith and Religion. Praeger/ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, CA and Oxford, England. See http://www.abc-clio.com/products/overview.aspx?productid=111248&viewid=1. [Shows the application of Type I and Type II Behavior to the evolutionary origins of faith and religion.] 3. Feierman, J.R. (2009). How Some Components of Religion Could Have Evolved by Natural Selection. In Voland, E. and Schiefenovel, W. Eds. The Biological Evolution of Religious Mind and Behavior. Berlin: Springer., pp. 51-66. http://www.amazon.com/Biological-Evolution-Religious-Frontiers-Collection/dp/3642001270 and http://www.springerlink.com/content/l79779627641n317/fulltext.pdf?page=1 [Contains the most detailed writing on how human religious behavior could have evolved by natural selection by breaking human religious behavior into Type I and Type II Behaviors.] Subject: Re: Need info on releasers From: Cecilia Lambert Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2009 08:33:47 -0700 (PDT) To: "Jay R. Feierman" CC: applied-ethology@usask.ca I would like to tell everyone why releasers became an interest for me. Last year, I took in a baby red fox. It's eyes weren't open yet, but a very small, slit could be seen half way across the bottom of the eyelid. She was very sick and became imprinted on me and my dogs. She was bottle fed and then hand fed until she was strong enough to eat normally. She enjoyed her food. Chicken legs, beef, deer and assorted vegetables. When she was about three months old, she was put in her pen One day, my intern asked if she could give Jenna a mouse that the dogs had killed in the garage. We gave her the mouse and she started "mouse pouncing", throwing the mouse in the air, burying it, digging it up and just having a good time. She had never seen a mouse before and was behaving differentlyt towards it than I had seen with her other foods. The next time I was at Wolf Park, I was telling Erich Klinghammer about the behaviors that I had observed and he told me that the size, shape and furry texture of the mouse were releasers for the behaviors. I thought that I would go back to continue the conversation, but now, Erich is very ill, so I have come to this list hoping to learn about releasers. CeAnn "He who does not punish evil, commands it to be done." Leonardo da Vinci CeAnn Lambert Indiana Coyote Rescue Center www.coyoterescue.org Please visit our gift shop @ www.cafepress.com/coyoterescue --- On Sat, 8/15/09, Jay R. Feierman wrote: From: Jay R. Feierman Subject: Re: Need info on releasers To: applied-ethology@usask.ca Date: Saturday, August 15, 2009, 7:25 PM John R. Lane: Hi CeAnn and Jay, Another very simply put reference to read would be "Learning and Behavior" 2009 sixth edition by Paul Chance. Start from page 12 where it begins discussing Modal Action Patterns and continue to page 16 at the end of the discussion on releasers. It also references a number of later works that help explain this overall concept and relationship as well as the Tinbergan work. It also make the same distinction that Jay makes in that there maybe very few if any true modal action patterns in humans. The role of genetics in human behavior is seen in general behavior traits rather than Modal Action Patterns. Jay R. Feierman: I don't know what percent of human behavior falls within the concept of a modal action pattern (aka fixed action pattern, coordinated motor pattern). However, there are more than a very few. For example, almost all of human courtship, copulation, parturition, mother-infant behavior, male:male agonistic dominance/submissive behavior, as well as all of the expressive behaviors (happy, sad, angry, disgust, surprise, fear, and neutral), and components of the greeting and departing ceremonies, etc. are modal action patterns. Because the threshold for release of modal action patterns (the so called "innate releasing mechanism" or IRM) is heritable in dogs, which accounts for lots of the behavioral differences of different dog breeds, there is no reason to presume that the threshold for release of modal action patterns in humans are also not heritable. We just don't "breed" for the differences in humans. As a result, different human societies are more like mixed breed dogs in terms of there being variation within the society in behavioral traits associated with thresholds for releasing modal action patterns. In general, there is more variance within societies than across societies in this sort of thing. However, there are some notable exceptions. One exception is the Navajo. I just returned from three days on the Navajo reservation, where I lived full time between 1971 and 1973. There is definitely a difference in "temperament" between Navajos and European Americans. The Navajo are calmer, quieter, and definitely more patient. These differences are reflected as early as the first day of life, as was demonstrated by the classic experiments of the late Dan Freedman (Department of Human Development, University of Chicago) in the 1960s. He put instruments under the bassinettes of newborn Navajo and European American one day old infants. The Navajo babies moved less, even at one day of age. There are lots of other examples of this quiet, calm, patient temperament with the Navajo. I don't know how to translate that into a modal action pattern. It just seems as though their general excitement and impatience lthreshold is higher. Between 1971 and 1973, I delivered about 300 Navajo babies. Navajo women in labor are for the most part silent, even at the time of birth. Very different from European Americans, African Americans and Latin Americans. One even sees this quiet, calm disposition in Navajo children adopted at birth by Europeans. Prior to about 600 years ago the Navajo of the American Southwest lived in Central Alaska. They are related to the Athabascan Indians who still live in Central Alaska. I suppose that there were selection pressures to be patient and not expend a lot of wasted energy in Central Alaska in the winter time, as it is one of the coldest places on earth. I. Eibesfeldt's book, Human Ethology, is almost entirely about the modal action patterns of humans. See http://www.amazon.com/Human-Ethology-Irenaus-Eibl-Eibesfeldt/dp/0202309703/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1250377430&sr=1-1 . That book is highly recommended for anyone interested in human ethology. I have done a fair amount of traveling in tribal societies in Africa and Asia and the Pacific Islands. When I go into such societies with my wife, neither of us can speak the tribal language. Yet, we manage to get along just fine in terms of getting our basic needs met. This is all done with body language. The only types of body language that is culturally universal, are modal action patterns. To join the Yahoo Human Ethology group, go to http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/human-ethology/ Subject: Definition of behavior? From: Robert DeFranco Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2009 12:57:44 -0400 To: applied-ethology@usask.ca Jay, You define behavior as "~ the independent movement of an individual." Perhaps this comes from a seminal article from Johnson and Pennypacker I recall from grad school whereby the authors developed an elaborate description of a unit of behavior. In any event, is not thinking behavior? Skinner felt it was. When a human "thinks," is not s/he using language, however silently. And while this may be absolutely measurable at this time, I believe that there was an experiment some years ago where sensors were placed on a human tongue and minute movements were detected when the individual was thinking. A child talks out loud when s/he plays and social pressures eventually prevail whereby s/he moves to a whisper and later to "talking to one's self." Is this not behavior? Robert DeFranco, MS, (PhD Candidate/ABD), BCCAB President American College of Applied Science 123 Dream Pond Rd PO Box 825 Crescent City, FL 32112-0825 USA Phone Toll Free U.S. and Canada 800.403 DEGREE (3347) ext. 701 Phone International 011.772.539.8005 Fax 386.698.4625 Email rdefranco@amcollege.us Web Site http://amcollege.us Virtual Campus http://amcollege.net Subject: Re: Definition of behavior? From: "Jay R. Feierman" Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2009 15:42:24 -0600 To: applied-ethology@usask.ca Robert DeFranco: You define behavior as "~ the independent movement of an individual." Jay R. Feierman: That is a new definition of behavior that I just started using. One of the members of the human ethology Yahoo group told me that my previous definition of behavior ("the self-directed movement of an individual as the result of the contraction of striated muscles") is "dualistic," as some people conceive of "self" in dualistic terms. So I changed "self-directed" to "independent." Robert DeFranco: Perhaps this comes from a seminal article from Johnson and Pennypacker I recall from grad school whereby the authors developed an elaborate description of a unit of behavior. Jay R. Feierman: I'd like to see that if you can find the reference. The problem with "a unit of behavior" is that "behavior" is a heterogeneous concept. In my terminology there is Type I and Type II Behavior. However, even Type I Behavior consists of reflexes and modal action patterns. In some way a reflex or a modal action pattern can be considered a "unit of behavior." However, I can't imagine how one makes a unit of behavior out of Type II Behavior, which I've defined as behavior that is describable by form and definable by function in a natural environment and not species-universal in form. One possible way of defining a "unit" of Type II Behavior is the amount of behavior (~ movement) needed to accomplish the (proximate use) function for which the behavior is named. So, for example if we're taking about human post-infancy maternal caring behavior and a mother is driving her teenage daughter to an after-school activity, the unit of behavior is all the behaviors used to drive her daughter to her after-school activity. Robert DeFranco: In any event, is not thinking behavior? Jay R. Feierman: It depends on how you define "behavior." If you define behavior in the way that I do, which is "the independent movement of an individual as the result of the contraction of striated (skeletal) muscles," then "thinking" does not fit that definition. Of course, I'd also have to know how you are defining "thinking." I say how I define and conceptualize "thinking" below. Robert DeFranco: Skinner felt it was. Jay R. Feierman: But Skinner defined "behavior" somewhat differently. Robert DeFranco: When a human "thinks," is not s/he using language, however silently. Jay R. Feierman: To me there are several components of "thinking": (1) self-perception of non-actualized symbolic language and (2) self-perception of graphic images retrieved from one's memory (3) self-perception of one's evolved a priori reasoning with information (that which is necessary to make decisions) in the not-yet-actualized language and the graphic images. So for example, I could think about how I'm going to pick up my grandson at his new school? What roads will I take to get there? I'm essentially talking to my self and visualizing different roads. However, in my terminology, which is idiosyncratic, an "idea" only graduates to a "thought" when it biases behavior (~ movement). So if I actually do drive down certain roads to pick up my grandson at his new school, my thoughts can be considered proximate, intra-individual, contributing causes of my behavior (~ movement). If I never operationalized the information in my thoughts by actually driving to his school, what is in my head would just be an idea - a non-operationalized thought. The problem with this terminology is that whereas we have a word "thinking" for the the (proximate use) function of thoughts, we a rarely ever used word, "ideating," for the (proximate use) function of ideas. It is important for me to reference as many cognitive functions as I can to behavior (~ movement), especially as the proximate, intra-individual, contributing causes of behavior. I also make a distinction between "thinking" (a proximate use function) and thoughts (which are made of structure/mass, since they contain "information"). Robert DeFranco: And while this may be absolutely measurable at this time, I believe that there was an experiment some years ago where sensors were placed on a human tongue and minute movements were detected when the individual was thinking. Jay R. Feierman: That would not surprise me, as we sometimes talk to ourselves quietly as we think. However, the movements of the tongue would not BE thinking. Rather, they would be the result or outcome of thinking. In ethology, they would be called "intention movements." Although thoughts are mass/structures capable of inducing thermodynamic changes in structures that receive and hold them, "thinking" is just a proximate use function that has no mass at all. The reason why thoughts are mass/structures/thermodynamic, is because thoughts are composed of actionable information. Information is not a proximate use function. Information is mass/structure and causes thermodynamic changes in the structure that receives, holds, and then releases the information. If you are interested in this concept of information, there are a series of "working papers" by Malcolm Dean on Cognitive Thermodynamics, which can be found here http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/human-ethology/files/Drafts%20for%20comments/. They are the last few files. Robert De Franco: A child talks out loud when s/he plays and social pressures eventually prevail whereby s/he moves to a whisper and later to "talking to one's self." Is this not behavior? Jay R. Feierman: Using the definition of behavior as "the independent movement of an individual as the result of the contraction of striated (skeletal) muscles," the behavior of the child above is the very subtle movements of the diaphragm, larynx, tongue and lips. The symbolically coded sound that is produced by the movements of the diaphragm, larynx, lips, and tongue is not behavior per se, as it does not fit the definition of behavior. Rather, the sound (symbolic vocalized speech) is the proximate use functions of the various behaviors used to produce either vocalized symbolic speech of written symbolic speech. To join the Yahoo Human Ethology Group, go to http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/human-ethology/