From: IN%"SUMNERR@ruakura.cri.nz" 1-MAY-1994 18:19:31.54 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Public opinion / animal welfare I am interested in all the opinions about public opinion. No matter which point of view you as scientists hold you all appear to regard the opinion of the public as important. My question is - who is conducting research on what the public thinks? For my part I can tell you what we are doing in New Zealand. As we write a social scientist colleague (Alison Loveridge ) and I are surveying the opinions of defined groups (farmers, veterinarians, welfare monitoring agencies, welfare lobbyists, general public) on issues of concern. We have relatively large sample sizes (100's to 1000's in each group). We are asking other questions to try to determine how the opinions are formed. Elizabeth Paul, of the Department of Psychology at the University of Edinburgh is carrying out similar work on animal experimentation in Scotland. Lindsay Matthews Hamilton, New Zealand. ================================================================================ From: IN%"MAPPLEBY@srv0.bio.edinburgh.ac.uk" "Mike Appleby" 2-MAY-1994 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: allison taylor's question Dear Allison Taylor, Just in case no one else answers your question, I shall. I think that most of us when we start thinking about welfare run up against the linguistic problem that the word 'welfare' seems to imply 'good welfare'. But the same is true of almost all words associated with measurement: 'luck' implies 'good luck', 'height' implies 'large height' and so on. The same is true for 'quality' which you suggest as a 'neutral and descriptive' alternative: further on in your contribution you slip into the implication that 'quality' implies 'good quality' by saying 'I guess what I'm getting at is that I tend to see quality of life as somewhat of a dichotomy : either an organism has it or it doesn't.' I think that most of us find that thinking of welfare as a state - present or absent - simply isn't useful. Things are variable, and we need a descriptor of that variability. That is not to say, of course, that welfare is a simple or unitary variable. Mike Appleby =============================================================================== From: IN%"ALund@ZI.KU.DK" "Lund, Anders {ZI}" 2-MAY-1994 To: IN%"applied-ethology-error@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: RE animal welfare Dear Jeff Rushen! I am trying to convey two points: 1. There might, and there might not, be congruence between the scientist's and the public's definitions. Scientific, not public, definitions should be the scientists prime concern. Unless of course, the scientist want to make politics. It is, after all, different levels. Besides, what does a scientist do, when the public claims the world is flat? 2. In science, you try to get an understanding of a phenomenon, by indirect meassurement of whatever relevant kind, since you can not get to "DAS DING AN SICH". A comprehensive model is no longer a model, just as a map in the scale 1:1 is not a map. Therefore, I find mr. Duncans statemens, obviously selfevident, since they cover said "DING", but of little help when it comes to develop SCIENTIFIC methods. Anders Lund =============================================================================== From: IN%"eagv49@castle.edinburgh.ac.uk" "R Young" 2-MAY-1994 09:34:47.94 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: A strange theory in a strange land: Behavioural Ecology Dear All, Just a few comments on applying Behavioural Ecology Theories (BET) to applied animal behaviour and animal welfare problems. I think one of the most common mistakes that I have observed, is scientists forget the context of the theories. BETs were developed in order to understand the behaviour of animals in their wild habitat, not to explain the behaviour of animals under highly artifical habitats such as farms or laboratories. I do not have a problem with scientists applying BETs to artificial habitats. I do have problems with scientists, forgetting the evolutionary origin of their animal and describing say the foraging behaviour of a pig as optimal under laboratory conditions without thinking about the consequences of the observed behaviour to wild living pigs. Especially as; for example, investigations by Alex Stolba and others showed that the behaviour of the domestic pig and wild boar were indistinguishable. Let us not throw common sense out of the window when applying BETs and remember BETs are 'A strange theory in a strange land'. I BET, if we always considered the animal's evolutionary origin then we would find our behavioural observations easier to understand. Regards, Rob. Young =============================================================================== From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 2-MAY-1994 11:49:29.25 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: anim. welfare (reply to Dead-n-Weary Pajor) In their recent posting on animal welfare, Dan Weary and Ed Pajor state: "As there have been a lot of clever things said about this subject by a lot of clever people, our contribution can only be a minor one." So far I agree. But they further state: "Our second point relates to the horribly anthrocentric view that an animal's welfare can only be defined on the basis of what humans think of the animals state. We argue that a better touchstone is the animal's view of its own state! As trained and experienced animal behaviourists we might be able to have some insight into the animal's view, and should be able to design clever experiments to get at exactly this." This makes the assumption that animals have a view of their own state. Is there any evidence for this? Before people start puffing themeslves up, let me make it clear that I am not suggesting that animals dont have consciousness. I think it most likely that most mammals and birds probably have a range of emotions (anger, fear etc.) of fairly short duration (minutes or hours) and that these probably feel something like our own short term emotions. However, as Mike Appleby points out, judgements about welfare are judgements about an animals state over a fairly long period of time. Personally, I am not sure that short lasting pain from castration etc is that serious from a point of view of animal welfare, unless there are longer lasting consequences. What we need to know to judge the welfare implications of housing systems is the sum of the mental experiences that an animal has had over periods of months, years or perhaps over its lifetime. I accept that an animal can have a view of its own state at a point in time (e.g. `I am in pain') but I am far from convinced that it can sum up its experiences over a long time (e.g. `I had a bad year'). This is why I am skeptical about the "quality of life" approach suggested by Alison Taylor. We, however, may be able to judge an animals quality of life, even if it cannot do so itself. For example, if negative emotions do influence the immune and various hormonal systems, then the longevity of the animal may reflect the sum of its mental experiences over its life far better than its behaviour at any one point in time. The much-malinged stereotypies may have real value in this respect since the degree of stereotypy shown in the behaviour may indicate the length of time that the animal has been frustrated. On public opinion they state: "Finally, we offer an alternative analogy to that of nuclear physics. How about the field of environmental studies? Here is an issue that is of great public concern - money is pouring into 'helping the environment'. The public, as bankrollers, have a right to specify the issues - say, for example, biodiversity. The scientists funded as environmental biologists will study this problem, if they are funded to do so, but how they do this is a scientific issue and not one of public opinion. Similarly, the public has agreed to fund our work on animal welfare, but they cannot really tell us how to do it - if they knew how, they wouldn't have to pay us the big bucks (?). " (BIG bucks did you say?) I agree completely. I could not have said it better myself! Let me state it in terms of animal welfare: How about the field of animal welfare? Here is an issue that is of great public concern - money is pouring into 'measuring animal welfare'. The public, as bankrollers, have a right to specify the issues - say, for example, mental suffering. The farmers, also as bankrollers, also have a right to specify the issues- say, for example, stress, health and disease. The scientists funded as to study animal welfare will study this problem, if they are funded to do so, but how they do this is a scientific issue and not one of public opinion. Jeff Rushen ============================================================================== From: IN%"GONYOU@sask.usask.ca" 3-MAY-1994 09:14:28.71 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Announcement: Program for North American meeting The following is a copy of the announcement of the program for the joint Canadian and U.S. regional meeting of the ISAE in Guelph on June 4-5. The meeting follows a conference on the Canadian Approach to Animal Welfare. Anyone interested in attending should contact Tina Widowski (twidowski@aps.uoguelph.ca). Please forward this program to others who might be interested. Abstracts will be published on the e-mail network shortly after the meeting. The program includes a discussion of future activities of the North American regions of the ISAE. If you are not able to attend, but would like to express an opinion on regional activities, please contact your acting regional secretary, either Joy Mench (jm59@umail.umd.edu) or Ruth Newberry (newberry@bcrsag.agr.ca). This program is being mailed to all North American members of the ISAE and those who have already contacted Tina. INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR APPLIED ETHOLOGY NORTH AMERICAN REGIONAL MEETING UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH GUELPH, ONTARIO JUNE 4-5, 1994 PROGRAM Saturday June 4 Opening Dinner and Social Evening at "The Bullring." Located across from University Centre following conclusion of Farm Animal Welfare Canada Tickets available for Barbecue buffet dinner $10/person (Cash bar) Dinner at 6:30, arrive early for cocktails. Sunday June 5 8:15 - 8:30 Registration 8:30 - 8:45 Welcome and Opening Remarks 8:45 - 9:00 Calling by domestic piglets: honest signalling and animal welfare. Weary, D.M. and D. Fraser, Ottawa 9:00 - 9:15 Vocalisations by piglets during castration: punishing pain or purely protest? Braithwaite, L., D.M. Weary and D. Fraser, Ottawa 9:15 - 9:30 A comparison of hot-iron and freeze branding on weight gain and aversive behaviour in feedlot cattle. Schwartzkopf, K., J.M. Stookey, J. McKinnon and E.D. Janzen, Saskatoon 9:30 - 9:45 Influence of human assistance at parturition on cow/calf bonding in beef cattle. Stookey, J.M., J.V. Bailey and J.R. Campbell, Saskatoon Discussion Coffee 10:15 - 10:30 Organization and function of the ISAE Nordic Region Bo Algers, Sweden 10:30 - 12:00 Organization and Function of the ISAE North American Region(s?) Topics for discussion: Goals of the Canadian and U.S. Regions Meetings, places and spaces Hosting the ISAE 1996 Meeting at Guelph Lunch 13:00 - 13:15 Can hens see the flicker of compact fluorescent lights? Widowski, T.M. and I.J.H. Duncan, Guelph 13:15 - 13:30 Evaluation of an enrichment device for caged laying hens. Taylor, A.A., G.I. Hurnik, and J.F. Hurnik, Guelph 13:30 - 13:45 Use of cover by domestic fowl. Newberry, R.C. and D.M. Shackleton, B.C. 13:45 - 14:00 Parent-offspring conflict in pigs. Pajor, E., Ottawa 14:00 - 14:15 Stress and maternal behaviour in pigs. Rushen, J., Lennoxville 14:15 - 14:30 Non-nutritive sucking by the calf. de Passille, A.M., Lennoxville 14:30 - 14:45 Post-hatching behaviour of turkey poults: life without Mom. Panning, L. and I.J.H. Duncan, Guelph Discussion Coffee 15:15 - 15:30 Preliminary study on maternal behaviour in water buffalo. Pinheiro-Machado, F., L.C. and A.L. Schmitt, F., Guelph 15:30 - 15:45 Diurnal activity patterns of a pair of captive red wolves. Moore, A. and R.J. Woods, Illinois State University. 15:45 - 16:00 Piglet savaging by gilts and sows: some possible causes. Harris, M. and H. Gonyou, Saskatoon 16:00 - ????? Informal presentation and group discussion: Animal welfare as a value-laden concept: Implications for science. David Fraser, Ottawa REGISTRATION Registration fees for the meeting will be $20 Cn ($16 U.S.) per person, taxes included. This includes entrance to the session, refreshment breaks and lunch. Cheques can be made payable to the University of Guelph and mailed with the enclosed form to Tina Widowski. The deadline for receipt of payment is May 20. ABSTRACTS Abstracts for presentations can be submitted on disk or electronically at the time of the meeting to be published on the Applied Ethology Network. Abstracts will be limited to one page in length and must include Title, Author(s) and Affiliation. ACCOMMODATION Anyone interested in obtaining information concerning accomodation in the university student residences can contact : Community and Conference Services Phone 519 824-4120 ext. 2352 Fax 519 767-1670 Anyone wishing to remain at the student residences for an extra night(s) following their stay during the Farm Animal Welfare Conference must indicate their intentions at least two weeks prior to the conference. TRANSPORTATION Guelph is located in southwestern Ontario, approximately 90 km west of Toronto just off Highway 401. The Brock Road Exit (Wellington County Rd. 46) into Guelph will lead you directly onto campus. For ground transportation from Toronto airport contact the Red Car Service (door to door shuttle from Pearson International Airport to Guelph). Book in advance by calling (519) 824-9344 or FAX (519) 824-1701. Ask about discounts for passengers travelling together. ----------------------------------------------------------------- ----- REGISTRATION FORM Name(s): Address: Telephone: E-mail address: Number of participants x $20 ($16 U.S.) = Number of tickets for the Barbecue x $10 ($8 U.S.) = Total = Are you also attending the Farm Animal Welfare Canada conference? Will you be staying in student residences? Please mail this form along with payment to: Tina Widowski, ISAE Organizing Committee Department of Animal and Poultry Science University of Guelph Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1 ----------------------------------------------------------------- From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 4-MAY-1994 06:25:24.47 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Behavioural ecology (Mendl/Weary/Pajor) Dan Weary, Ed Pajor and Mike Mendl trot gallantly out to the defence of behavioural ecology, armed with a variable mix of insult, cliche, hyperbole plus some good points that will help us evaluate the conditions under which the methods will be helpful to applied ethologists, and what we can expect of applied behavioural ecology. Most of their examples are used to support the arguement that the insights gained into animal behaviour as a result of the past decades of research into functional questions will help us understand the causal basis of farm animal behaviour. I have no problems with this, since it concedes my main point: that our proper business is to understand the causes of behaviour. Obviously, any means to this end are valuable, providing that they are means. I also agree that functional models can provide some intellectual context for our research. But to get this context, we only need read papers in behavioural ecology, we dont need to do experiments on farm animals. Under what conditions would the insights of behavioural ecology prove useful? I suggest the following: 1. The most important is that their predictions be counter- intuitive. It is of no value if these models predict what we already know. To avoid giving insult, I shall illustrate this by my research on pigs, mentioned by Mike Mendl. One "prediction" of game theory approaches to fighting would be that the bigger pig will win the fight. This prediction is staggeringly uninteresting, because everyone who works with pigs knows this. The idea of dishonest communication and parent-offspring conflict are such counter- intuitive predictions, and I am sure that Dan Weary's and Ed Pajor's research on this will prove interesting. But applied behavioural ecology needs to be more than just common sense dressed-up. 2. Speculation about the evolutionary functions of farm animal behaviour, AS AN END IN ITSELF, is futile because we will never know the selective pressures that operated on the wild ancestors of domestic animal and we can never know how artificial selection has altered this. The effort required to do this would not be justified by the result. 3. I tend to agree with Rob Youngs comment that it is not very useful to try to "test" general behaviour ecology theories by using artificially selected farm animals in a highly unnatural setting. Ed Pajor and Dan Weary react to my rantings by expressing shock and outrage that I would presume to criticize areas of research as "useless" and argue instead that we should "follow our hearts and use the approaches that we find most interesting". To dispel the notion that I am the only one with this anti-social tendency, let me quote A. J. F. Webster (p513-524) (in Proceedings of VII World Conference on Animal Production, Edmonton 1993): " It is however difficult to escape the conclusion that much of this (welfare) research is neither very good science nor very helpful in practice....I offer (some) examples of welfare research which is of little use either because it is not very good science or because the science is irrelevant to the primary objective. . Diligent and statistically correct pursuit of the obvious; e.g. most catalogues of animal behaviour in different husbandry systems". I would hate to see added to the list: "Empty speculation about the evolutionary past of farm animals based on laboratory studies of artificially selected animals." His example covers a great deal of the research done in applied ethology, which was presumably done by "following the heart". I guess it depends on whose heart we follow. I suggest that the laissez faire approach to research has not given applied ethology a good reputation and that we need to be a little more critical of the approaches we adopt. Obviously, new approaches are needed, but the application of behavioural ecology is far from being unproblematic. I see nothing wrong with giving some thought as to how it might best be applied. (I hope I am not giving the game away, but rumour has it that Ian Duncan may be discussing such matters in his Wood-Gush Memorial lecture, so I look forward to hearing what he has to say on this. Hopefully we can continue this discussion after his talk) Jeff Rushen =============================================================================== From: IN%"NEWBERRY@BCRSAG.AGR.CA" 4-MAY-1994 11:20:50.04 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Animal welfare and behavioural ecology It seems (not surprisingly) that views on what animal welfare is depend on the background of the person concerned. Those of us with a zoological background tend to place more emphasis on health status and behavioural adaptations in the context of the types of environment in which the animals evolve. Those coming from a psychology background place more emphasis on human and non-human thoughts and feelings. Those coming from an agriculture background place more emphasis on farm animals as selected for certain production characteristics and how they cope with farm environments. (Jeff, I suppose this is stating the stunningly obvious!) Since there is much to learn from all three approaches, it seems counter-productive to exclude any one approach. Furthermore, I think that, not only can behavioural ecology contribute to a better understanding of animal behaviour in captivity, ethologists working with captive animals can contribute to a better understanding of behavioural ecology by expanding existing models to fit behaviour of animals living in captive enivironments. Yes, these animals have been subjected to different selection forces from those in the wild but non-captive environments are also quite variable. I see many parallels between captive animals and animal living on islands. I view captive animals as being on a continuum with animals in other environments. I don't think that it is constructive to view captive animals as artificial animals living in artificial worlds. Ruth Newberry Agassiz Research Station, B.C., Canada =============================================================================== From: IN%"PELLE@hygieia.hhyg.slu.se" 5-MAY-1994 03:26:58.69 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Animal Welfare FROM:Per Jensen, Skara, Sweden SUBJECT:Animal Welfare Dear Networkers, Thank you for all comments and debate on the subject of animal welfare. Several new threads have been thrown out and picked up by different persons, and there is clearly a need for a thorough scientific discussion on many aspects of this area. I would like to make some points clear: I may have been unclear in my original message and conveyed the opinion that a definition of welfare would be a theory of welfare. Of course, it's not, but they do relate. You can not have a theory unless you have defined the concept about which the theory is. However, my main point was that we really *need* a welfare theory. Then what is that? I think many of the e-mails on this subject reveals a considerable confusion of where science ends and subjectivity/ethics starts. This is a problem, because we will have rather little problem (I think) to get data on basic biological phenomena regarding how an animal 'works'. However, we face huge problems when we wish to interpret these data in terms of welfare - in particular when we want to make cut-off decisions (such as 'acceptable' vs 'non-acceptable'). To me, a theory is set of rules, definitions and connections that help us interpreting data. For example, counting different seeds of corn made little scientific sense until Mendel formulated a theory of genes. Even though he had no idea about real genes or DNA, the theory helped interpreting data. A theory does not have to be right - it only has to be in congruence with available data, and it must be formulated in such a way that it can be refined and modified in the light of new data. I think that ethology has a number of good theories that help us explain behavioural data in the light of function, evolution, ontogeny and mechanism. But we run into problems when we attempt to interpret them in light of welfare. I would like to see theories providing the framework for welfare oriented behavioural research, that helps us selecting variables and interpreting data. In this way behavioural data could be made accessible to an ethical discussion. For example: Assume that animal A performs a lot of stereotypies. At our present state, we are locked on the level 'Does this animal suffer?'. However, we should have an intermediate level of welfare interpretation theory. It is on this level I suggest we forget about animal feelings and focus on things we can actually derive from empirical data. On the next level, I think the cognitive issues can be of interest. On that level, we may say things like 'Mammals are likely to have the same basic feelings as humans and since humans experience negative emotions when their behavioural opportunities are severely restricted, so may other mammals'. But it's essential to keep the levels apart. That means I have no problems with feelings being important for animal welfare, but since they are not accessible to empirical investigation, we should not restrict the scientific welfare studies to things that are associated with feelings. Or, in other words: Show me the empirical evidence that there are feelings, and I agree they are crucial in assessments of welfare. However, until then - let's occupy our science with something we can access. Some networkers have tried to escape the problem by suggesting to split the term: Welfare - Ethics; Short-term - long term welfare. In fact, this may be a good idea. I would add another possibility: Perceived - assessed welfare. The perceived welfare may be the subjectively experienced part of the welfare problems and the assessed what we actually measure. Thus, the patient with a tumour may have a low assessed welfare, whereas perceived welfare may not be affected. Finally, I can only agree with those who have problems with the 'poll approach' to animal welfare. Whereas public opinion may be of importance for the final cut-of points, it should of course not affect our scientific definitions the least. If Georgia Mason thinks scientific terms must be defined in some accordance with colloquial use, she should come up with new terms. However, this may cause a lot of other problems, and I rather suggest we define our terms in the light of science and forget about the public opinions on our subjects. Best wishes, Per Jensen =============================================================================== From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 5-MAY-1994 08:47:38.87 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: The Drama of Animal Welfare- a thought experiment. The background: A small African country has decided to keep its laying hens in battery cages. Local animal welfare groups are outraged and demand that that the Minister for Agriculture ban battery cages on the grounds that they cause the hens mental suffering. Sensibly, the Minister decides to do some research to see if these claims are true, and offers a research grant. Per Jensen submits an application and is succesful. After lengthy philosophical speculation, Per Jensen decides that one cannot measure mental suffering scientifically and so `redefines' welfare so that it is shown by reduced biological functioning i.e. fewer eggs laid. ACT 1: One year later. The Minister has summoned Per Jensen to her office to decide whether or not to renew his research grant. Minister: Professor Jensen, do hens experience mental suffering when placed in battery cages? Prof. Jensen: Madame Minister, hens in battery cages lay fewer eggs and therefore have lower biological fitness. This allows me to speculate about their behavioural ecology in the remote past. But, from this, I can infer nothing about their mental state. Furthermore, if I try to infer their mental state, my scientific purity will be tarnished. Question: Which of the following is most likely? a. The Minister, having read all the emails, will conclude that public opinion consists of the lunatic rantings of an uninformed rabble, and renews the research grant. Besides, with an election so close, she has better things to worry about than public opinion! b. The Minister has read research from New Zealand showing that the public is concerned about mental suffering NOT biological fitness. She gives the grant to someone else who is more likely to provide the information that the Minister needs to deal with the concerns of the public. c. The Minister concludes that scientists are living in a dream world, that the animal welfare problem must be dealt with without scientific help, that science is useless to practical problems and agrees to cut the research budget for that year. (Produced, written and directed by Jeff Rushen. Starring: Per Jensen, and Georgia Mason as the `women-in-the-street'.) ============================================================================== From: IN%"PELLE@hygieia.hhyg.slu.se" 5-MAY-1994 09:41:10.07 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: The welfare drama Nice script, Jeff. Only one problem: The real Per Jensen would never apply for that first grant anyhow. I also suspect the scenery needs a clarification: With reduced biological functioning, I do not mean anything about fitness. I could only agree with Georgia Masons earlier stated views, that fitness bears no relation to welfare. However, biological function is more than that. For example, i think we can outline proper models of motivational control of behaviour, incorporating all the flexibilities and variations that are around, and specify these for different behavioural systems (e g dust bathing or nesting). Once a proper model is outlined, we can also deduce from empirical evedence whether a particular animal in a particular environment acts in accordance with the normal functioning of the system, just be recording behaviour (no production, no feelings). When, for example, a sow spends large periods of time repeating the same motion pattern over and over again, I would say that this indicates reduced welfare, regardles of whether the sow actually feels bad or even is high. Because the system was not designed to work this way. How do we clarify how the machinery is properly working? By old-time, traditional, patient ethological research. We need to start out by studiying the behaviour of animals in semi-natural environments, not to conclude, but to refine our questions. Then we can do more or less clever experiments and see how the actual mechanisms are designed. This will enable us to say whether or not an animal in a specific situation (say, a hen without access to dust bathing substrate) is working in biological correct way or not. This is what I'll provide as an ethologist. Then we need some clever welfare theorists to come up with a good theory of how to put this into a holistic welfare assesment of the hen. Following that, I expect some philosophers, informed consumers and politicians together with some ethologists and welfare theorist my come up with some ethical cut-off lines. That will probably be the level where we decide that biological mal-function in hens is not acceptable, whereas the same is morally irrelevant when it comes to tomatoes. Per Jensen (Film star?) ============================================================================== From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 5-MAY-1994 09:55:09.14 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: The Drama of Animal Welfare/ Act 2! THE SCENE: A remote African country has decided to keep gestating sows in tethers. A group of veterinarians and farmers have become concerned that the stress from this reduces the animals` immune system and increases the chance of disease. Having consulted the Oxford English Dictionary they conclude that this could be described as a welfare problem, and offer a research grant to improve the welfare of pigs. Ian Duncan applies. ACT 2: The interview. Chief Vet: "Professor Duncan, we are all very impressed with the quality of research you have done into the issue of animal welfare, which we consider among the best in the world. Your incisive views on behavioural ecology are also interesting. We wish to offer you this grant." Ian Duncan: "Gentleman, thank you for your confidence. Unfortunatley, I have spent many long, whiskey-filled nights pondering the fate of bruised tomatoes and fir trees. I conclude, strictly from a semantic point of view you understand, that the word "welfare" only refers to mental suffering, and nothing else. The word "welfare" should not be used to describe your problem, and I must refuse your grant." The vets smile politely, thank him for his interesting views, and show him the door. On the way out, he passes the applicant who will get the grant: a vet who measures stress and health, and who is not particularly concerned by whether or not this should be called "welfare". (A "Holistic Definition" Production). =============================================================================== From: IN%"NEWBERRY@BCRSAG.AGR.CA" 5-MAY-1994 10:05:10.66 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: The Drama of Animal Welfare - what really happened The background: Per Jensen discovered that more eggs were obtained from modified battery cages than free-range. ACT 1: The Minister summons Per to her office and commends him for proving that animal welfare actually equals improved productivity. ACT 2: Per receives accolades from leading farm groups. ACT 3: Per receives a knighthood from the Queen of the small African country, and a large cash reward allowing him to continue his excellent research. THE END (another Hollywood of the North production) ============================================================================== From: IN%"IDUNCAN@APS.UoGuelph.CA" 5-MAY-1994 10:50:55.32 To: IN%"Applied-Ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Welfare Drama Priority: normal I feel I must defend myself. First, I would never start a sentence describing whisky-filled nights (get the spelling correct Jeff - whiskey is stuff from Ireland fit only for cooking and paint removal!) with the word "Unfortunately"! Second, always with an eye for the main chance, I would actually have said, "The phenomenon you describe certainly poses a health risk for the sows AND MOREOVER you may also have a welfare problem. This phenomenon of reduced immune function is often associated with various states of suffering. I can certainly carry out experiments to prove whether the pigs are suffering or not. With a five year research grant I may even be able to quantify the suffering. In the course of my studies it is likely that I will be able to identify the causes of the suffering. This should allow a solution to be found. This answer will solve the health risk problem (the reduced immune function) and the welfare problem (the suffering). Question: Do I get a 5 year research grant? Do I get double the funds for solving (I am usually successful!) the health problem AND the welfare problem? Do I get an Oscar for my performance? ============================================================================= From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 5-MAY-1994 14:22:28.58 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Welfare drama / changes to the script (same ending though) Per Jensen has pointed out that his view of reduced welfare as biological mal-functioning does not involve reduced fitness, but rather involves animals not working the way they have been designed to. This is a far more scientifically-interesting, equally irrelevent concept. You will need to rewrite the script I sent out previously. Answer (b) to the question should now read: (b) The Minister has read research from New Zealand showing that the public is concerned about mental suffering NOT about biological mal-functioning. The rest of the script can stay the same, especially the end (i.e. the bit where the Minister decides not to fund the research further since the definition of welfare is not related to what the public is complaining about). Sorry, for the mix-up. Jeff ============================================================================== From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 5-MAY-1994 15:23:11.71 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: an insulting script! I wish to complain about the recent play script that was sent over this network.(The Drama of Animal Welfare - what really happened). This is the one where Per gets large amounts of money for proving that welfare and productivity are the same. I found this script insulting to welfare scientists. It seemed to be implying that there was a political dimension to animal welfare and that people might be chosing one definition of welfare over another for mainly political reasons rather than for objective, scientific ones. Was the author trying to imply that those who favour the farmer/producers tend to focus on welfare measures of health, stress and productivity while those who favour animal welfare groups tend to focus on mental suffering and behavioural deprivation in measures of welfare? Next, we will be told that the source of our research funding might influence the way we define welfare! Rubbish! I hope we dont see any more of this offensive insinuation that sometimes scientists fail to show the highest and purest level of objectivity in their approach to this problem. ============================================================================== From: IN%"GJM10@PHOENIX.CAMBRIDGE.AC.UK" 6-MAY-1994 04:39:40.54 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: whisky galore A sleazy question from the 'woman-on-the-street' - if someone has drunk enough whisky for their biological systems not to be working in the way in which they are designed to, do they have a) a welfare problem b) no welfare problem c) a welfare problem but no ethical problem - or an actual welfare problem but not a perceived one ??? The reason I ask is that I'm still not clear about Per's definition of welfare in terms of altered functioned or disruption of normal biological systems. Is ANY deviation from normal functioning a welfare issue? I'll repeat my question about neutered animals (and leave fitness out of it for the time being - I'm talking about biological systems functioning normally in the hear and now; and anyway, animals that don't breed aren't necessarily unfit, though that's another issue): do neutered animals BY DEFINITION have a welfare problem? Over to you, Per! Georgia =============================================================================== From: IN%"bwechsler@esh.unibe.ch" 6-MAY-1994 05:24:18.62 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Animal welfare discussion I joined the applied ethology network yesterday and I am astonished about the animal welfare discussion that is going on. In the german speaking part of Europe we had the same discussion during the last years, mainly among members of the Internationale Gesellschaft f=FCr Nutztierhaltung (IGN). A summary of this discussion has been published in volume 23 of the series Animal Mangement: Ecology, Ethology and Health. The reference is: Buchholtz, C., Goetschel, A.F., Hassenstein, B., Loeffler, K., von Loeper, E., Martin, G., Rohrmoser, G., Sambraus, H.H., Tschanz, B., Wechsler, B., and Wolff, M. 1993: Leiden und Verhaltensst=F6rungen bei Tieren. Birkh=E4user, Basel, Boston (ISBN 3-7643-2672-7). Translation of the title: Suffering and Abnormal Behaviour in Animals. My personal conclusion in this discussion was that both physiological parameters of health and stress AND ethological parameters of a mal-functioning of the evolved behavioural organization of an animal can be used as INDICATORS for suffering in animals. Based on such indicators WE (scientists, philosophers, consumers, politicians ...) have to DECIDE that a specific animal housing system is associated with a welfare problem and hence has to be improved or banned. I see no problem to inform the public about the physiological and ethological indicators that are used to make welfare decisions. People are ready to accept that a sick or a stressed animal is suffering and they can also understand that an anmial performing stereotypic behaviour is suffering. The assumed (!) public opinion that welfare only refers to mental suffering can be related to the way a physiologist or an ethologist defines and measures welfare. If there are differences in the use of the word "welfare" in different groups of a society, discussion and mutual information is a good solution. But this will force the scientists to leave their ivory tower. Beat Wechsler ============================================================================== From: IN%"AG150AB@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" 6-MAY-1994 16:00:13.13 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: more bad scripts [Scene] SuperScientist is sent to a remote Canadian province to study the problem of biodiversity. She spends three years describing the species composition and numbers in different habitats and takes her report to the minister responsible... Minister [pale from horror]: You, you've spent these years and thousands of our devalued dollars counting moulds, slugs and creepy crawlies??? My opinion polls show that the public's interest in biodiversity centers on a few large furry mammals that they can empathise with!! SuperScientist can now take one of two roles.. SuperScientist 1 [shaking in fear and with runny nose]: ah yyyyess, terribly sorry, I'll go right back out there and concentrate on those furry mammals that are so important, please, please dont cut my funding, please... or.... SuperScientist 2 [with a confident and relaxed manner, looking the happless politian in the eye]: Yes minister, and this is exactly why I have begun a series of media interviews, public lectures and discussions to help inform the public why it is important to take the scientifically sound approach that I have used. As you know, science and public eductation must often proceed hand in hand. [superheroes can't help but to sound pedantic on occasion...] Dan Weary (key grip, not to be confused with key gripe - we all know who that is...) ============================================================================== From: IN%"AG150AB@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" 6-MAY-1994 16:02:25.24 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: and more, and more, and more Animal Welfare - the comedy Jeff Rushen, a highly respected scientist, is called to a meeting with the minister of animal welfare. The ministry of animal welfare is a small, hard to define organization which is known for its above average thermal atmospheric conditions. The minister wants to know exactly what is included in her ministry. Jeff replies smugly that this is not a serious problem since all that needs to be done is ask the public " what is animal welfare". "This" says jeff "will not only answer your question but the public will also be on your side". The rookie Minister buys the slick talking scientist's arguement and commisions a poll asking the question WHAT IS ANIMAL WELFARE. The 5 most frequent responses to the poll are: 1. I don't know 2. What is animal welfare !? 3. How much is this poll costing the taxpayers? 4. Why don't you ask a scientist ? 5. I'm going to vote for Reagan Unfortunatly, the results are leaked to the press by a pair of concerned taxpayers in Ottawa. This results in the ministry of animal welfare being closed down, Jeff loses his job and is almost deported, the Minister is made the head of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). While head of the CBC the former minister proposes a sitcom in which a single parent and unemployed circus clown named Geoff (pronouced Jeff) tries to raise, based only on public opinion polls, 2 above average children (named ed and dan). The results are hilarious as the children grow to be dull bureaucrats. Unfortunatly before the show can come to air, Ronald Reagan is elected prime minister of Canada and in a typically thoughtful appointment names Jeff to be head of a new ministry, Science and Ethics. Jeff first move is to stop all funding to anyone who admits to ever thinking about behavioural ecology. Wondering what he should do next, minister jeff commisions a poll. Ed Pajor (head gopher, not to be confused with any other rodent) =============================================================================== From: IN%"alp18@cus.cam.ac.uk" "Dr A.L. Podberscek" 7-MAY-1994 05:34:46.13 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Curtain call "Animal welfare play must end" scream the New York critics. And so it came to pass that the play did end. Audiences had initially thrilled to the tale of definitions, theories and sex, and would each night leave the theatre with something to think about. But then, only weeks later, the audiences became bored. Hadn't they heard it all before (probably in past lives as well)?? Why did some of the actors talk to cast-mates about script changes during the play? Shouldn't they have done that during rehearsal? Audience numbers dwindled, the critics had their knives out, and finally, finally, the curtain came down. The lights went out, the actors went home alone, and the director applied for a job at Walt Disney Productions. For those who missed it, no tears please. For the play will be staged again in the not too distant future with a new director, actors and set...but probably the same old dialogue. Anthony Podberscek "The imagination lives on... Dept. of Clinical Vet. Medicine scientists die" Cambridge UK ============================================================================== From: IN%"voless@castle.edinburgh.ac.uk" "J Cooper" 10-MAY-1994 16:05:50.51 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Dramatic License As the curtain falls for a final time and the disillusioned and dissatisfied audiance of academics stalk into the night, a dusty, beer stained folder "Animal Welfare: first draft" is found beneath a pile of dusty beer stained chicken costumes in the chorus dressing room. Originally rejected in favour of a "feel-good" finale, the original script with its gritty, real life edge is taken on by a repertory group of gritty northern actors, to tour the country, begiining with packed houses on the Edinburgh fringe (Shurely not). The new drama is a rollercoaster of emotions. The stage is split between an African rural scene, and a research station somewher in northern Europe or America. A dozen chickens peck and scratch between huts (built from local renewable resourses, by local craftsmen according to traditional styles, for this African nation is truelly an ethical Utopia). A small boy runs from one bush to another checking for eggs that may have been missed earlier in the day. Meanwhile, somewhere in Northern Europe or America. Boffins chortle, pat each other on the back and finger nonchalently a small statuate with the inscription "Noble Prize for...." The multidisciplinary research team were able not only to demonstrate (objectively) that Modified cages lead to both the highest egg production and lowest incidence of disease, injury and mortality of all the systems investigated, but also that (subjectively) they maximise individual hens "Well-being", and still maintain their scientific credibility (The scientists as oppessed to the chickens, who are never in any danger of comprimising their principles). The eggs are, however, more expensive to produce than battery eggs from their less ethically sound near neighbours. The goverment maintains its moral highground (an unlikely scenario), refuses to introduce import tariffs, as it believes that free trade is the best means to maintain good relations with its better armed neighbours and being a democracy, lets the people decide. Having commisioned a further survey to establish the publics' perception of animal welfare issues, it sets out on a programme of education, to inform the proletariate of their responsibilities to animals. This programme raises public awareness, but fails to effectively educate in the subtle nuances of welfare science, which was still the subject of hot debate within original researchers. Consequently, when the "Animal-centred, welfare-friendly cage" is presented in a blaze of publicity, the people see only a small, wire cage, and decide not to buy eggs from a system that they percieve to be distinctly unnatural and unsuitable for the hens. In the final scene, the members of the research team are to be found sitting behind a seemingly endless line of desks, phoning each other up. Back in Africa, the goverment has fallen following public outcry over wasting resources. The neighbouring country whose egg-based economy was failing as its major export market had shrunk, has taken advantage of this instability to invade. Tanks roll into the village, closely followed, by portakabin chicken sheds. The lights fade on the stage as the chickens are rounded up. Finis Apologies if this somewhat fanciful tale has upset any sensibilities. I'm still working out where I stand on welfare definitions and theories, and wether the above rant contributes anything useful at all. Actually I do have a view, but I think if anyone persevered with this to the bitter end then they need a rest. Yours Truelly Jonathan Cooper ============================================================================== From: IN%"PAJORE@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" 11-MAY-1994 08:29:58.56 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: From: OTTB::AG150AB 11-MAY-1994 10:23:56.74 To: PAJORE CC: Subj: Holistic view of Welfare and Time Scale I would like to comment on the recent postings on the time scale and the holistic view of animal welfare. In principle, I agree with Mike Appleby's point that the long term assessment of animal welfare is an interesting issue that has been greatly ignored in favour of the short term aspects. However, this is done for good scientific reasons. Short term aspects are more open to experimentation and description. Measuring long term aspects and determining how the short term aspects relate to one another and the animals overall welfare is more difficult. I quibble with Mike's statement that "we have to consider the lifetime of the animal RATHER THAN the shorter time scale" I would prefer to change "rather than" to "in conjunction with". I also agree with some of what Jeff says (I know its hard to believe ...) a) I'm not sure if animals can integrate mental states over a long period of time (but this raises questions about animal learning and the trust animals show their regular handlers). b) long term aspects are important and the hormonal and immune measures that Jeff suggests are food for thought. I'm still not sure about stereotypies. However I disagree with Jeff's anthropocentric approach, which is to ignore the short term pain animal's experience and concentrate only on long term effects where "we can judge the quality of life even IF the animal cannot". I think that, from the animal's point of view, short term physical pain, such as castration, is important to its welfare, regardless of the long term consequences. An interesting issue arises. To what extent do we allow animals, given their lack of moral principles, to formulate the ethical structure that we use in dealing with them? Is that ethical structure the definition of animal welfare? Does that structure change depending on whether or not the animals are directly in our care? If so, does that mean that animals have no intrinsic rights but humans have responsibilities? Does this mean that Jeff's anthropocentric view may be correct? I think I better go lie down. Ed Pajor ============================================================================== From: IN%"AG150AB@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" 13-MAY-1994 13:41:28.16 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Values in animal welfare - ISAE, Guelph, June 5, D. Fraser The role of values in our concept of animal welfare: Background for a discussion at the regional meeting of the ISAE in Guelph, June 5. Here is some background that people may wish to mull over before the discussion that I so rashly agreed to lead. Let us imagine that a building inspector has been asked to examine a dubious rooming house and report to the local authorities on (1) its height, (2) the weight of sun-bathers that would make the balcony collapse, and (3) the building's overall safety. The height of the building can be measured directly once we have clarified any ambiguities of definition (e.g., what parts of the building are to be included) and specified the conditions, at the time of measurement, of any factors which may influence the height. Let us refer to properties like height, consisting of single attributes which can be measured directly, as "type 1 concepts". The weight of sun-bathers that would cause the roof to collapse cannot be measured directly. Rather, it has to be estimated on the basis of various contributing variables such as the design of the supporting structure and the thickness of the beams. Nonetheless, we consider that under a specific set of conditions there should be a particular weight that will cause the balcony to fail. Hence, when different people have different ideas about how such an estimate should be made, we think of these as more accurate or less accurate approximations to the correct answer. Let us call such concepts -- single attributes which cannot be measured directly, but which can be estimated by combining contributing variables in an appropriate way -- "type 2 concepts". The safety of the building, unlike the height and the maximum loading of the balcony, is not a single attribute but a concept embracing numerous attributes including the level of toxins in the air, the slipperiness of the floors, and the soundness of the fire escapes. We regard these as aspects of safety because they serve a common function; that is, they all contribute in one way or another to the health and survival of users of the building. We might try to combine a number of these attributes to create some overall index; for example we might create a fire safety index by awarding 5 points for each smoke alarm and 10 for each emergency exit. However, we recognize the arbitrariness and limitations of such measures. We do not consider that there is some correct quantitative expression that represents the safety of the building, in all respects and for all users, which we try to approximate by combining variables in a logically or technically correct way. Let us call a concept like safety -- a trait involving multiple attributes linked by some commonality of function -- a "type 3 concept". (Note, of course, that this three-category system is not meant to imply that the categories are always clearly distinct, nor that further subdivision would be inappropriate.) Values are involved in different ways in the three types of concepts. In measuring type 1 concepts, scientists generally try to eliminate any impact of values; we consider it wrong, for example, for an inspector who dislikes a building to give a biased measurement of its height so that the building will have to be altered. Estimating type 2 concepts, such as the strength of a balcony, is in principle a purely technical matter, but value- related differences may occur if there is uncertainty over the technical issues. The tenants, who want the balcony strengthened, may choose a formula that gives the most pessimistic estimate of the existing strength whereas the landlord, who wants to spare any additional expense, uses the most optimistic. Values are conditionally involved in such estimates because the impact of values is conditional on there being insufficient knowledge for the correct formula to be known. In such cases, science can hope eventually to eliminate the impact of values by perfecting the technical accuracy of the estimation. In the assessment of safety and other type 3 concepts, different people will likely attach different levels of importance to different attributes. Occupants of the top floor consider better fire escapes to be particularly important; asthma sufferers emphasize the need for clean air; the sun-bathers want a strong balcony. These differences do not arise simply because there is insufficient information to establish "the" technically correct weighting of the various factors, but rather because there is no single, technically correct weighting. In such cases, values are involved inherently (not conditionally) because there is no entirely objective way to establish the relative importance of different factors. With type 3 concepts, science may generate information that moves different parties closer to agreement, but science cannot hope to eliminate the inherently subjective element in judging the relative importance of different attributes. Conflicts over the assessment of animal welfare often arise because different individuals tacitly disagree on whether to treat welfare as a type 1, type 2 or type 3 concept. Many members of the general public, and a few scientists, seem to treat animal welfare as a type 1 concept, and look for a single, measurable property that will provide an objective assessment of an animal's welfare. Other scientists treat animal welfare as a type 2 concept -- a single attribute in principle, but which in practice is estimated by integrating contributing variables. I am prepared to argue (at truly unsociable length) that animal welfare should be viewed as a type 3 concept, and to explore certain implications of this conclusion for the scientific study of animal welfare: (1) Because of the inherent role of values in our notion of animal welfare, we cannot adequately capture the meaning in a technical definition of the term. (2) While we can do objective studies of attributes relevant to animal welfare, there is no purely objective way to combine these into an overall measure of animal welfare. To speak of "measuring animal welfare" involves the conceptual error of treating animal welfare as a single attribute. (3) Hence, science is limited in its ability to compare overall welfare in disparate environments. David Fraser, Ottawa ============================================================================== From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 16-MAY-1994 14:02:23.15 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: The Drama of Animal Welfare: The Comeback!! The recent screening of the mega-hit `The Drama of Animal Welfare' has smoked out some of the variant attitudes that exist with regard to how animal welfare should be defined, and has revealed that an ethological training does not necessarily improve drama-writing skills. The following shortened version is being produced for television. (To avoid boredom, Cambridge viewers will instead see a film in which Anthony Podbersek is torn apart by an enraged pit-bull terrier). Episode 1: The death of objective definitions of welfare. ACT 1. The choice of definition of animal welfare is found to have political implications. Scientists try to provide an `objective' definition of welfare but are influenced by their own political beliefs, their personal views on animal welfare, and by their source of research funding. Individual scientists favour a definition of welfare that emphasizes their own scientific speciality (e.g. ethologists tend to favour one based on normal behaviour), while scientists as a whole try to make themselves indispensible by emphasising the importance of scientifically testable definitions. Thus, an `objective' scientific definition of welfare is impossible from the beginning. ACT 2. There is little agreement over how much the `public' should be involved. Some try to keep the public out altogether: they claim to define and assess welfare objectively (but see ACT 1). People who favour this view see welfare as a property or state of the animal. Others try to involve the `public' at the initial stages of defining welfare to ensure that the research remains close to the public concerns. Those favouring this view see `welfare' as a value-laden concept, reflecting societal values as much as the property of animals themselves. The extent to which scientists listen to the public in formulating definitions of welfare reflects their general political attitude. This further reduces the chance of having an `objective' definition of welfare. ACT 3. There is continuing arguement over the importance of subjective experiences in the assessment of animal welfare. Some view subjective states as causal variables so that any mental suffering that results when animals are placed in an improper environment is the direct cause of health problems. Others feel that subjective states should be ignored because we cannot yet objectively measure them. Attitudes to this reflect philosophical attitudes to the mind-body problem rather than scientific attitudes. These belifs seem impervious to reasoned arguement. Thus, they are more like religious views than objective scientific hypotheses. The outlook for an objective measure of animal welfare is not good! Stay tuned for the next exciting episode: `The Balcony Collapses!'. ============================================================================= From: IN%"bjarne.braastad@nlh10.nlh.no" 18-MAY-1994 05:35:50.22 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Welfare: term - concept Dear all, I am a bit frustrated and confused by the discussion on how to define animal welfare. It seems to be working like this: 1. First choose a term (in this case: animal welfare) 2. Then define a concept for which this term could be used. It is obvious from the discussion that people discuss different concepts: * Concepts dealing with the perceived well-being of the individual (mainly in short term, but sometimes with long term effects), including emotional effects, * concepts dealing with the 'objective' state of the animal with regard to fitness in evolutionary terms (which perhaps should include kin selection), and * concepts dealing with the ethical and political views of the public or funding sources about how animals should be treated. These different concepts are of course partly overlapping. Since different people speek of different concepts, we should instead take this strategy: 1. Define carefully each of the different concepts which are of interest. 2. Then find a separate term for each of these concepts. Since the term 'Animal Welfare' is used in so many ways, it is unsuited for a precise discussion. Preliminary, I might suggest the terms 'Animal Well-Being', 'Coping Level', and 'Animal Ethics' (or Animal Ethics Level, if someone needs a scale here) for the three concepts indicated above. Take stereotypies as an example. An individual performing stereotypies may increase its well-being (at least in short term). It may also be argued that the coping level is increased, but this is not so clear-cut. However, the animal ethics level is low, since many people regard stereotypies as undesired. It is even possible that these three concepts should be further sub-divided. Any comment on these suggestions would be welcome. Bjarne O. Braastad Dept. of Animal Science, Agricultural University of Norway, Aas, Norway. =============================================================================== From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 18-MAY-1994 07:25:44.03 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: special issue AABS As many of you will be aware, Elsevier Publishers and the International Society for Applied Ethology (ISAE) have agreed that one issue per year of the journal Applied Animal Behaviour Science will be edited by the ISAE. Plans for the 1994 issue have more-or- less been finalized and are as follows: 1. Under the arrangement, no more than one-third of the issue can consist of abstracts from ISAE meetings (both summer conferences and regional meetings). For the 1994 issue, only abstracts of spoken papers at the summer (Northern-hemisphere-wise) congress to be held in Foulum, Denmark 1994 will be included. Instructions for preparing abstracts for this have already been circulated by the conference organizers and those of you who wish their abstracts to be published must send them to me by the 20th June. However, (NOTE) only send me the abstract once you have been notified by the conference organizers that your abstract has been accepted for a spoken presentation. 2. At the summer Congress there will be three plenary talks (on environmental enrichment- Ruth Newberry, stress- Ebbie von Borell, and individual differences in behaviour- Per Jensen) and the first D. G. M. Wood-Gush Memorial lecture by Ian Duncan, who will explain why. The full text of these talks will be published. There are also plans for a workshop/discussion group on teaching in applied ethology. If space and time permits, a summary of this workshop may be included in the special issue. 3. There will be a series of invited papers on the topic "New Approaches to Studying Social Behaviour". These will include the following: - The geometry of selfish animats (sic) and robot ethology. W. R. Stricklin, J. Z. Zhou and H. W. Gonyou . -Assessing optimum space allocations and group sizes for domestic animals: an ethological approach. L. Keeling. - Social strategies in animal behaviour: causal and functional approaches. M. Mendl. -Signalling of need: using animal communication to assess welfare. D. Weary and D. Fraser. -Conflict and cooperation in social behaviour. E. Pajor, D. Fraser and D. Kramer. -Moods, minds and molecules: Neurochemistry and social behaviour. J. Mench. -Social transmission of information. C. Nicol. The Future: At the next Council meeting, we shall be discussing what to do with the next Special Issue and so I would appreciate hearing your views on the following questions. 1. Should we continue to publish abstracts? 2. Are the guidelines for writing abstracts (to be published) OK or do you have any complaints? 3. Should we continue to have invited papers on a special topic? 4. If so, what should the special topic be for next year? 5. Any other suggestions? Jeff Rushen Editor, ISAE rushenj@ncccot2.agr.ca ============================================================================== From: IN%"RUSHENJ@NCCCOT2.AGR.CA" "JEFF RUSHEN" 18-MAY-1994 07:39:13.83 To: IN%"APPLIED-ETHOLOGY@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: stereotypies/ coping Bjarne Braastad made some interesting points about the different levels in animal welfare and I hope I find the time to give them the consideration they deserve. However, he makes two points that I feel compelled to comment on. He states that "An individual performing stereotypies may increase its well-being". I thought this idea had been buried long ago. It is certainly not the case in pigs, on which most of the research has been done. The only evidence that might support this is Jonathan Coopers work on voles, but I believe even this can be interpreted differently. (Besides, voles are only funny little rodents, not REAL animals). If anyone has more recent evidence for this, I would be interested to hear it. He also discusses "Coping" and "Coping level". One hears these terms constantly in discussions of animal welfare and stress. However, I believe that there is no clear evidence of farm animals performing "coping" behaviours at all. It has become fashionable to describe the behaviours animals show in response to assumed stressors as "coping behaviours". But this only confuses. The word coping should be avoided unless there is clear evidence that this is what the behaviours are doing. Sorry to lay down the law, but trust me, I"m right! Jeff Rushen =============================================================================== From: IN%"eagv49@castle.edinburgh.ac.uk" "R Young" 31-MAY-1994 09:48:19.73 To: IN%"applied-ethology@sask.usask.ca" CC: Subj: Special Edition of AABS, Keynote Speaker, Etc. Hi Everyone, Recently Mike Mendl and I, have been discussing the subject of hierarchy in scientists, nepotism, etc. It has come to both of our attentions that the way scientists in any field conduct themselves, often has more to do with self advancement rather than the advancement of science. This often takes the form of controlling who gets to write articles in Special Editions of journals, who gets invited as a keynote speaker to conferences; it often appears to the younger struggling scientists that nepotism and mutual altruism (you scratch my back I'll scratch yours) determines who gets such invitations. I would like to suggest that one way out of this situation (which I feel is very unprofessional and unfair) is to allow open competition for articles in special editions of journals, or to give keynote talks or even invited talks such as the David Wood-Gush Memorial lecture. By open competition I mean that a general invitation goes out to everyone to submit a manuscript or talk for consideration, which are subsequently refereed by a panel of peers (in the same way that journal articles are normally reviewed). The best papers are then selected for publication or the best talk for presentation. I feel the benefits of this open competition are one, it would reward ability (rather than merely age or present position), two, it would give younger scientists goals to work at achieving and three, it would improve the standards of special edition journals and those of keynote speakers at conferences. I hope that these suggestions are useful in generating discussion in how to improve our field of scientific endeavour. Rob. J. Young ================================================================================